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ABSTRACT
The economic crises of the 1970s placed pressure on national
policy makers and planners to find new ways in which to
respond to preserve national development plans. Among the
most serious of the issues was the ability to preserve
access to food supplies without having to adversely affect
capital investment for national development plans. The
specific nature of food insecurity differed across
continents and countries. The small islands of the
Caribbean found themselves especially vulnerable to the
volatile international market place. This thesis is an
attempt to chart the issues of food security as it pertains
to developing island economies, and specifically the
Caribbean Community, and a consideration of mechanism of
response that are at the disposal of the Community.
First, the exact context of a small country in the
international food place is delineated. Because of their
particular geographic, economical, military and political
makeup these islands are subject to different considerations
in their analysis than provided for in the main stream
literature. The purpose was to outline the limitations that
face them in the quest for food security.
Second, the region's food matrix was examined. This
involved an analysis of both the production and consumption
side of the matrix. Special emphasis was placed on the
structure of the region's agricultural sector which for all
intent and purposes has remained unchanged for the past 400
years.
Third, the regional response through the Caribbean Food and
Nutrition Strategy (CFNS) was evaluated. The evaluation
involved a consideration of the aims, means and results of
the plan as proposed. The main conclusions are that theStrategy's focus on working within existing constraints,
instead of attempting to remove them, and its failure to
adopt a truly regional planning character have resulted in
its failure to halt the decline of agricultural in the
1
region.
Finally, the use of an input-output framework with inter-
industry, inter-country production flows as a mechanism for
comprehensive regional agricultural planning was identified.
The procedure involved establishing a framework for decision
making and monitoring the process of regional agricultural
restructuring and revitalization. The exact mechanism
involves some form of island specialization based on
regional priorities and national political and economic
agendas.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lance Taylor
Title: Professor of Economics
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CHAPTER I
FOOD SECURITY IN FOOD
IMPORTING COUNTRIES
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INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s the Green Revolution appeared as the agent
of growth for agriculture in the Less Developed Countries
(LDCs). The results on the new high yielding varieties
(HYVs) has been well documented. Despite the difficulties
surrounding the cold war, there was general optimism that
the Malthusian prophesy had been avoided. The work of
Professor Norman Bourlag at the International Center for
Corn and Wheat Improvement Project (CIMMYT) in Mexico and of
others at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)
in the Philippines gave a new meaning to the struggle
against the low-level equilibrium trap and the population
bomb. Increases in food supply would help in rasing the
standard of living of the underdeveloped countries, and
through this birth rates would themselves decline.
The premise of the Green Revolution was based on the
intensification of land use and new technological
applications. The new agriculture was founded on the use
of hybrid varieties dependent on large doses of fertilizer
and other specialized production techniques. Nonetheless,
its application spread rapidly around the globe. In many
countries the impact was dramatic, and production doubled
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and tripled over the traditional average yields. At that
precise moment when famines had threatened to release the
Malthusian dread in diverse groups of LDCs, technological
advances had added a new dimension to food production.
However, the general optimism soon gave way to cause for
worry. Two factors were especially responsible for the
change in perspectives.
First, global food prices skyrocketed in 1972 in the
aftermath of the so-called "Russian grain deal." A mixture
of crop failure and rising demand for meat protein by the
Soviet working class saw the USSR's net grain imports rise
from 1.4 million tons in 1971/2 to 21 million tons in
1972/3.1 The Soviets had carried out a literal coup d'etat
on the world grain market. Beside the diplomatic harangue
that the policy unearthed, the impact on the world grain
market was to worsen the grain shortage and bid-up the
already high prices in the world grain market.
There were poor harvests in Southeast Asia, Australia
and the U.S.A. The latter two being major exports of food.
Famine conditions existed in India and the Sahel. The net
results were higher world food prices and the depletion of
the cereal stocks of the main exporters. The world cereal
stock fell from a ninety-six day supply in 1972 to a 26 day
supply by mid-1973. 2
The second major factor was not directly related to
food but was to prove the dominant theme in the 1970s. The
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formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) in 1970s struck new difficulties and themes
into the post-World War 11 Bretton Woods agreement which had
governed international economic life for the previous
twenty-five years. OPEC's sudden rise to power was based on
its members' control of the majority of the world's known
reserves of hydrocarbons, the main energy supply of the
modern industrial world. The use of an energy cartel as an
element of diplomatic bargaining and economic leverage
conjured up ideas of other vital commodities being used as
bargaining chips on the world stage. Not least among those
commodities with the potential for Bismarckian agendas was
food -- i.e. wheat, maize, soybean and livestock. The
reaction of the world's main food producer, the United
States, to the crises did little to avert fears of the main
food importing countries. "Hungry men listen only to those
who have a piece of bread," the U.S. Secretary of
Agriculture is quoted as saying. He added, "food is a tool.
It is a weapon in the U.S. negotiating kit." Senator Hubert
Humphery concurred, "food is power. In a very real sense it
is our extra means of power." 3
Despite the technological improvements in most of the
world's agricultural regions, the mid-1970s ushered in an
era of perceived vulnerability by large groups of countries.
The dimensions of world food production, distribution and
consumption had been altered against them. It was the sense
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of vulnerability to political manipulations and the
uncertainty of nature that gave rise to the struggle for of
Food Insecurity. This essay is an attempt to highlight the
difficulties of gaining food security that is faced by small
countries, especially the Commonwealth Caribbean, and to
analyze their present approach to the crisis.
Most of the decisions for attaining food security were taken
in the 1970s and so it is an analysis of this environment
that will be the starting point of the thesis. The aim is
not to chart the course of the world's food supply, but
rather to understand the factors that led to the
establishment of food security schemes in many parts of the
world in the 1970s.
* * * * * * * * *
TYPES OF FOOD INSECURITY
Although a defined area of study in itself, there is no
agreed upon definition of Food Security4 . This stems not so
much from a lack of consensus on the importance of food but
rather from the multiplicity of factors involved in the
process of food procurement. Within different geographical,
political and economic contexts food insecurity takes on
different proportions and manifestations. The most complete
definition is that of Siamwalla and Valdes:
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"Food security may be defined as the ability
of food deficit countries, or regions or
households within these countries, to meet
target levels of consumption on a yearly
basis."
Although this definition is acceptable for most
purposes it will be necessary need to add additional
dimensions to the concept for purposes of this presentation.
In many developing countries the question of food
security is not simply a short term bread and butter issue.
Rather it has to be placed within the development framework.
The issue revolves not only around feeding oneself, but
rather of doing so under conditions that do not adversely
affect policies for economic development. For instance, it
is not inconceivable that middle income countries can
purchase as much food as they need on the world market.
However, in doing so large amounts of foreign exchange is
sacrificed for short term consumption and limits their
ability to import much needed capital goods which contribute
to long term growth. Being left open to the vagaries of the
international market place offers as much a sense of
insecurity as not being able to secure a constant food
supply. While one manifests itself in a short term plate to
mouth fashion, the other appears in an economic sense as
reduced growth.
Before giving a working definition of food insecurity
it is necessary to explore the different types of food
insecurity. This will aid the development of our more
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extensive definition.
Temporal Food Insecurity
At the very elementary level it is possible to speak of
the temporal dimensions of food insecurity. Thus,
differentiation can be made between short term and long term
food insecurity. In short term analysis, the question
revolves around an immediate crisis, i.e. a constant food
supply for immediate use by the given population. The time
period under scrutiny ranges from a couple of months to a
year. Usually a crop cycle is the domination factor of
definition. Long term food insecurity centers around more
fundamental structural problems. Usually it implies
continuous vulnerability of existing sources of supply,
utilization of vast sums of foreign exchange for
procurement, and the necessity for restructuring the present
food production and distribution policies.
Important as they are, temporal considerations must be
placed within a geographical context. And it is here that
issues of food security are usually defined. In a
geographical context there are three levels for evaluating
food insecurity, the international level, the national level
and the level of the household. 6 There are no clear
boundaries between the three, and a delineation of where one
ends and the other begins is open to subjective conclusions.
The three levels are intricately linked. The following
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delineation is necessarily a simplification for analytical
purposes.
Geographical Food Insecurity
Household food insecurity invariably is a plate to
mouth issue. In the short term famine is the main type of
such food insecurity. In the long term, chronic
malnutrition is the best representation of food insecurity.
These two aspects of food security at the household level
varies across regions and countries, but this generalization
will do for the present purposes.
Aggregation of the household problem culminates in
national food insecurity. Although the components of the
nation is the household, food insecurity at the national
level manifests itself in a different form. First, the
country as a whole may be self-sufficient in food but have
distribution inefficiencies because of economic inequality,
transportation logistics, lack of information, or a
combination of all three. Second, while the household may
be able to purchase food, the country may not have the
necessary foreign exchange to participate in the
international food market.
At the international level food insecurity stems from a
dwindling of reserves or a sudden rise in prices. At this
level there is a myriad of political and economic factors
involved as nations interact on the international scene,
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each seeking its own ends.
The pivotal element on all three levels is the action
and interaction of the nation states. National
considerations and policies influence both household
procurement and international demand and supply. This is
not to say that there is no reverse effect. However, an
exploration of the causes of food insecurity allows a better
comprehension to the centrality of the nation state in the
food matrix.
Having described the different levels of food
insecurity it is now necessary to develop a working
definition for this essay. In speaking speak of food
insecurity the reference will be from the national
viewpoint. The analysis will involve not only a short term
context but also an appreciation of the long term economic
consequences. Operationally, food security will be defined
as the ability of nations to ensure a constant and
sufficient supply of food to its population that is
consistent with the preservation of national self-
determination and national economic development.
Importantly, a political-economic element has been added to
the food security debate. This stems from the fact that too
many times economists have treated the real world as an
apolitical arena. The unfortunate reality is that it is
not.
The definition as proposed enables us to focus on the
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two sides of food security from the national viewpoint.
First, it recognizes the problem as one ensuring the
reference population of a food supply. Second, it
acknowledges the action and interaction of states in the
diplomatic complex and the market place as an essential
issue. In reconciling the problem of food insecurity
countries must invariably balance the two facets in
designing their policies. The necessity is augmented by the
growing interdependence of the global economy. An internal
decision in the India that increases its agricultural
inefficiency can mean higher food prices in Costa Rica.
* * * * * * * *
SOURCES OF FOOD INSECURITY
In developing an analytical basis for a workable food
security policy it is necessary that certain assumptions
that abstract slightly from the real world be made. In this
context it is assumed that the national policy to be
followed is dictated by the actions in the other two
spheres, i.e. at the level of the household and at the
international level. By initially assuming that the
internal food supply is in equilibrium with demand it is
possible to develop scenarios in which the nation state must
undertake the development of national food policies that
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recognizes its pivotal role in the food matrix.
Production Instability
The most important source of food insecurity is the
nature of national production. In the expanded use of the
term, internal sources of food insecurity have two facets.
First, as may be that countries simply cannot grow enough
food to feed themselves. The exact delineation of this
problem lies beyond the scope of this paper, since the
beginning assumption, as outlined above, is that internal
measures at present are optimum strategies (within the
conditions of the household and the international sphere)
and react only when the balance shifts in such a manner as
to present a threat to food security. Later in this essay
as the analysis becomes more sophisticated there will be
cause to relax this heroic assumption.
On a worldwide scale the production problem comes to
light in the fact that the 1970s was characterized by a
slowdown in growth rates for production, new areas of
production, and output yields. These ominous signs were
compounded by the fact that the poorer countries also tend
to be those with the worst agriculture record. This is
shown in Table 1-1, which shows the average annual growth
rate for population, food production and consumption by
regions since 1961. Agricultural production has generally
increased faster for the LDCs. However, the high population
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TRBLE 1-1. Growth Rates of Population and of Production and Consumption of
Staple foods in Developing and Developed Countries, 1961-1977.
Production growth Consumption growth Production growth
rate as a percentage rate as percentage rate as a percent
of population of population of population
POPULATION 'AVERAGE ANNURL GROWTH RATE, 1961-77 gorwth rate growth rate growth rate
1977
COUNTRY GROUP millions) Population Productioon Consumption
Developing 2092 2.6 2.7 2.9 103 111 93
Countries
BY REGION
Asia 1207 2.5 2.8 2.5 112 103 109
North Africa
Middle East 240 2.6 2.6 3.5 97 132 74
Sub-Saharan Rfrica 311 2.? 1.6 3.4 58 86 67
Latin America 333 2.7 3.2 3.6 118 132 89
By GNP per capita growth rate, 1961-7?.
Less than '1.0 % 338 2.5 1.3 2.3 53 94 56
1.0-2.9 percent 1019 2.5 2.9 2.6 117 105 111
S.O-4.9 percent 279 2.8 3 3.3 110 120 91
5.0 percent 456 2.7 2.8 3.3 101 123 83
Developed 1139 1 2.6 2.3 274 237 115
Countries
E E C 269 0.6 1.8 2.2 290 178 163
E. Europe and
U S S R 369 1 2.8 3.5 294 364 81
United States 217 1 3 0.9 291 91 321
Others 284 1.2 2.3 2.7 182 216 84
WORLD 3230 2 2.6 2.5 135 128 105
Note Mainland China is excluded
Source : J. Price Gittinger et al, FOOD POLICY p 42-43
growth rate has slightly outstripped production in those
regions. The table shows that Third World agriculture has
not kept pace with population growth.
Even those countries with the potential to feed
themselves solely from internal production has suffered from
the age old problem of agriculture -- its instability.
Under the new agriculture technology of the Green Revolution
that encompasses many of the world's surplus producing
agricultural systems fluctuations have tended to be larger
and more regular.7 This occurs mainly because the
technology of the Green Revolution is very sensitive to
occasional changes in climatic patterns. Short periods with
low supplies of water for irrigation schemes may mean the
ruin of whole crops, while at the same time too much water
can be detrimental to crops.
Economically, the Green Revolution depends on the
increase of market exchanges. Thus, crucial inputs such as
seeds and fertilizers have to be secured in the market
place, making their acquisition very sensitive to shortages
and price changes.
A representation of production instability is shown in
Table 1-2. In many of the LDCs shown the probability of
production falling below 95% of the trend is as high as 40%.
The implications of a production shortfall of this magnitude
can be ominous for a country's food security position.
When consumption cannot be met internally countries must
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TABLE 1-2. VARIABILITY IN THE PRODUCTION OF STAPLE
FOODS, 1961 TO 1976
Instability in Production
'of Staple Foods
Probability
of actual
Region Coefficient production
and Standard Deviation of Variation falling
Country (thousands of metric tons) (percent) below
95 % of
Trend
ASIA
Bangladesh 765 6.4 22
India 6653 6.4 22
Indonesia 1040 5.4 18
Korea, Rep. of 445 7.1 24
Philippines 346 5.7 19
Sri Lanka 107 9.3 29
NORTH AFRICA/
MIDDLE EAST
Algeria 531 28.9 43
Egypt 282 4.5 12
Jordan 119 65.6 47
Libya 56 28 43
Morocco 1156 27.2 43
Syria 702 38.8 45
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Ghana 121 5.8 20
Nigeria 958 5.7 19
Senegal 325 18.6 39
Tanzania 430 12.7 36
Upper Volta 128 9.8 30
Zaire 190 4.9 15
LATIN AMERICA
Brazil 1631 5.2 17
Chile 215 11.1 33
Colombia 126 4.4 13
Guatemala 56 6.5 22
Mexico 1060 7.7 26
Peru 197 9.8 30
notes:
St'd dev.: Defined as the standard of the production
variable Q - Q
Coeff. of var.: Defined as the standard variation of
the variable (Q-Q)/Q.100
Source: Barbara Huddleston, D.G. Johnson, S. Reutlinger,
A. Valdes, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE for FOOD SECURITY, p20.
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venture into the international market place. Once a country
ventures into this new market place the variables under its
control is altered and the interaction at this level can under
certain circumstances increase problems of food insecurity.
Growth in International Trade
The growing inability of certain groups of countries to
feed themselves (permanently and in the short run), and the
ability of others to be large scale surplus producers have
resulted in large increases in world food trade. It is
customary to relate this increase in the world food trade to the
high population growth rates in the LDCs. However, the
inability of agriculture to keep pace with rising standards of
living and demand for meat protein in the Eastern European
countries, the restructuring of world production and new
ideological trends also contribute.
The new industrialization drives of many Third World
countries are usually undertaken with little regard to the role
of agriculture in economic development, thus governments place
priority on the manufacturing or primary (non-agricultural)
sectors with large foreign exchange earning capabilities, while
neglecting the indigenous food base. As the interdependence of
the global economy tightens and many underdeveloped countries
structure their economies towards export oriented growth based
on assumptions of comparative advantage less resources are
placed in national food production. With such policies
20
TABLE 1-3. TRADE IN CEREALS , BY REGION, SELECTED PERIODS
(millions of metric tons)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1961-63 1969-71 1976-78 1981
REGION OR COUNTRY Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Impnrts Exports
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
--
North Africa
Sub-Sahara, fr-ica
South Afric-a
North America
Central Ameria
South Hmer- i ca
Asia and Near East
Japan
Wssterr Europtis
Eas5terrn Eur..ph
U S S F
Ocr-ani .
wORL
2.8
1.9
0.2
1.2
2>
3.7
19.5
5.9
33. 1
8.9
1.6
0.3
1.1 1
0.6
0.7
415.8
0. 1
5.. ?
6
7. 6
1..? 7
7-. r~
6.4
3.5 0.8
3.1
0.3
0.9
2.8
5. -4
26.6
14. 7
-40 .3
8..E
n-7
0.6
1.3
50.1
0.6
11
3
0.7?
18.L. 6
-.6
7.9
8.9
9.9 0.2 15.2
5.3 n.5
0.1 2.6
1 101.8
5.8 O-1
9.3 14. 9?
37 .9 9.9
21.9 0.1
49.9 26. 5
14.1 3.7
0.3 12.3
z.cUrc~: j + tinci&.; Qt. .~il.
9.2
0.5 t
1.6
11.2
12.. 1
53.7
24.4
44. 1
19.5
-43.7
0. 1
0.1
0.5
41.5
136.2
0.1
19. 1
12. 1
40. 3
3. 4
2.6
13.3
104.;~.. 110.5
countries once self-sufficient find themselves continually on
the world food market and become net food importers.
The result is a net rise in the food trade, with the main
exporters being the More Developed Countries (MDCs). Table 1-3
shows the increase in cereal trade by regions for selected
periods. It is important to realize that the less developed
regions have been characterized by small increases in exports
and large increases in imports between the 1961-65 period and
1981. The chief exporting areas are North America, Southern
Africa (dominated by South Africa and Zimbabwe), South America
(dominated by the Brazilian soybean production), and Oceania.
Price Instability
As food deficient and food surplus countries meet in the
international market place new elements of food insecurity are
introduced. Not least among them is price instability. In the
absence of any meaningful stabilization policy agricultural
prices tend to roller-coaster. As the world market for food
enlarges countries find themselves in a vice-grip vis-a-vis
price fluctuations. When food prices fall countries find that
it is to their economic benefit to import grain. While this may
tend to be cost effective in the short run, this has the
substantial effect of undermining local prices for farmers and
making one more dependent on foreign supplies as the new
competition destroys the local food producers. When the world
prices are artificially low for prolonged periods the internal
22
economy may adjust to them, the end result being a distortion of
the economy.
TABLE 1-4. INTERNATIONAL TRADE PRICES FOR
SELECTED AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, 1970-81.
( US dollars per ton)
Wheat
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
54.75
61.73
69.81
137.79
180.78
151.02
121.99
104.72
130.81
163.14
164.24
174.53
Rice Maize
143
130.1
149.1
368.1
542.1
363.6
255.3
275.7
369
334.2
433.3
521.3
58.26
58.26
55.9
97.63
131.88
119.29
112.59
95.27
100.78
115.35
126.37
140.54
Beef
1197
1230
1374
1893
1442
1202
1477
1383
2015
2783
2635
2863
Soybeans
121
128
143
290
277
220
231
280
268
298
296
304
Notes:
wheat: u.s. No.2, hard red winter, ordinary. f.o.b. Gulf
rice:thai white, 5% broken, milled, f.o.b. BAngkok
maize: US No.2, yellow, f.o.b., Gulf
beef: Australian frozen cow beef, boneless, c.i.f., USA
soybeans: US No.2, yellow, bulk, NFS, c.i.f. Rotterdam (UK
up to 1976)
Source: FAO, Commodity Review and Outlook, 1981-2, FAO
Rome
Table 1-4 shows the international trading price for
five major food commodities since 1971. Except in the case
of beef, where the price per ton has double between 1970 and
1981, the rise in price has almost tripled over the period,
with large fluctuations over the characterizing the general
upward trend. Historically, the pattern has been that
prices will rise since the price of artificial distortion is
too much even for the advance economies to bear. This is
illustrated by the periodic difficulties that surround state
23
funding for agricultural subsidies in the U.S.A and the
E. E. C. When this occurs importing countries find themselves
with gigantic food bills which necessitates large supplies
of foreign exchange if national consumption is to be
sustained at acceptable levels. Thus, many development
efforts must be postponed or even abandoned to keep the food
supply constant. At the same time the previous distorting
prices that destroyed the national food base leaves it
unable to help in confronting the national dilemma. One
attempt at capturing price volatility is illustrated in
Table 1-5, which shows the coefficient of
TABLE 1-5. VARIABILITY IN REAL EXPORT PRICES
FOR WHEAT AND RICE,1950-79
WHEAT RICE
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
of variation Deviation of variation Deviation
YEARS (percent) (U. S) $/ton (percent) (U. S) $/ton
1950-59 11.2 26 11.4 59
1960-69 3.6 7 17.5 89
1970-79 30 56 39 187.6
Source: Barbara Huddleston et al, International Finance for Food
Security p 15
variation and standard variation for the world price for
wheat and rice. Both commodities have higher standard
deviations in the 1970s than in the 1950s.
Earlier reference was to the fact that production
instability was an increasing source of food insecurity.
However, it is necessary to realize that this is at the
24
national level only. The fact is that,
"the global coefficient of variatiog is
smaller than for most countries."
This indicates that shortfalls in one set of countries
is more or less off set by boom in production in other
countries. The rational question that arises is, what is
the source of the price instability? The answer lies in the
harsh reality of the global market place. Most countries
pursue national stabilization policies which reverberate in
the international market as a source of instability. This
effect is especially magnified when the major exporting
countries are involved.
The economic reality is that there is no single "world
market" for food. The "market" is so oligopolistic that
national food policies on the part of the major sellers
distort any semblance of a world market. The European
Economic Community (EEC) is now one of the major exporters
of wheat and other food stuffs, but the protectionist legacy
and price subsidies of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
is legendary. 9  In the U.S. the belief is continuously
expressed by farmers and congressmen that stabilizing world
prices means that large storage costs are encountered for
the sake of the rest of the world and leads to stable prices
that are too low. As one observer put it,
"The 1977 U.S. farm legislation may have been
the first in modern time that was delib rately
designed to increase price instability."
25
Terms of Trade
The international market place has long been a place of
contradictions. For example the very prosperity of oil rich
countries has led to their increased debt problems as they
borrowed on potential resources that have not translated
into sustained higher foreign exchange earnings. The
contradiction has manifested itself in a heightened form in
the agricultural terms of trade for developing countries,
the major countries with food security nightmares. It has
long been an accepted economic fact that the terms of trade
between agricultural goods and manufacturing products goes
against agriculture. However, very little analysis have
been done for trends between different classes of
agricultural products. With the rise in the international
grain trade it is now relevant, and possible, for such an
analysis to be undertaken. Under a broad, but not
inaccurate, assumption that LDCs are importers of food
commodities (i.e. non-luxuries) and exporters of luxury
agricultural products we can achieve a rough picture of the
terms of trade for agricultural exchanges between the center
and the periphery.
Tables 1-6, 1-7, and 1-8 show one attempt to capture
the changes. In a study focusing on agricultural prices and
export earnings of developing countries in the 1970s the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) devised means to
show the difference between agricultural imports and exports
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TABLE 1-6. AGGREGATE CHANGE IN DOLLAR PURCHASING POWER OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS IN
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1970-79. ($ million, 1970
BRAZIL
IVORY COAST
COLOMBIA
THAILAND
INDONESIA
CUBA
GUATEMALA
EL SALVADOR
KOREA Pep.
INDIA
NI CARAGUiJA
DOMINICAN Rep
KENYA
CO'ETA PICA
RF;HHNIS TAN
CAMEROON
ECUADOR
MALAW!I
IPAN
MAURITI IUS
BOLIVAR
HUNDUPAS
RWHNiiDH
PHP!HI IITlY
SEi'IEGAL
SEI R1H Li ABI  4
LEHADOIIN
5992.8
2276. 93
2070.31
1932.68
1388.78
1355.86
1272.96
850.15
847.66
546. 87
534.31
451.86
346-49
342- 1
307.44
303.04
275.08
262.46
245.5
233.85
231.85
2202
2'0.:..49
188.31
187
155- A!
1. 15S3. 52
MRRTINIQUE
JORDAN
KUWAIT
GUYANA
SURINAME
CHAD
SOMALIA
CYPRUS
UPPEP VOLTA
GAFMB IA
ZAMRIA
GUADELOUPE
CENT. AF. REP
£ I ERRA LEONE
BAPAROOS
ETHIOPIH
MALI .
MAURITANIA
CONGO
TUNISIA
PEUN I ON
LIBEPIA
TOGO
VENEZUELH
BURMA
DENI N
.TAIA I CA
104.2
98.39
89.23
88.7
63.98
51.62
42.68
18.21
15.86
3 .7'
-7.2
-14.1
-17.56
-21.09
-2-7. 97
28.87
-35.99
-62.32
-74.26
-11.13
-12.06
-7. 37
-137. ;32
-141.55
-146. 1
-152. 71
MADAGASCAR
T'DAD & T'GO
PHILLIPINES
IRAQ
TANZRNIA
SYRIA
NIGER
PANAMA
ZAIRE
PEPU
GHANA
SUDAN
URUGURY
MOROCCO
PAKISTAN
MOZAMBIQUE
UGANDA
ARGENTINA
HNGOLA
SRI LANKA
MEX' I CO
BANGLADESH
ALGEPI h
NIGUERIH
EGYPT
.urc: F , Hroutur.31 Pricea aid Export Carmongrz:: the :perienc. - developing
Countries in t'hr? 1970--, F 1U Pame P31H-94.
prices)
-173.45
-173.93
-204.62
-211.95
-321.24
-325. 7
-340.16
-349.79
-366.73
-380.92
-442.76
-653.45
-696.25
-719.13
-744. 32
-754.86
-758.49
-791.14
-832.03
-930.63
-1104.51
-1147.21
-126?!. 80
-2022.01
-2774.99
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 1-7. AGGREGATE CHANGE IN DOLLAR COST OF AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS IN
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1970-79. ($ million, 1970 prices)
E YPT --------- 45 9 ~.1 ~~~~2 AR NTYN 24-.23~ ~ ~~~ MBWIiA 4~~ ~-- 5.91 ~
BRAZIL 3257.43 IRAN 214.57 PANAMA 43.2
KORER Rep 2930.22 CYPRUS 212.53 UGANDA 28.63
MEXICO 2508.08 MARTINIQUE 161 COSTA RICA 28.51
SAUDI RABIR 1745.09 PARAGUAY 160.99 RWRNOA 25.47
NIGERIA 1523.31 ETHIOPIA 146.42 SYRIA 23.48
PHILLIPINES 1242.47 IPRO 129.71 URUGJUAY 7.49
PERU 1172 NIGER 119.69 INDONESIA 5.52
PAKISTRN 1021.72 TOGO 117.65 CENT. AF. REP -5.31
MOROCCO 905.42 GUADELOUPE 112.49 CAMEROON -6.34
LEBANON 817.36 BENIN 96.03 SURINAME -11.21
ZAIRE 765.6 MAUPITIUS 88.89 SUDAN -15.09
ZAMBIA 725.22 LIBERIA 87.63 BURMA -18.42
JORORN 667.08 GUYANA 87.6 TUNINISR -25.5
VENEZUELA 643.34 COiNGO 37.24 CHAR -49.63
THAILAND 631.63 UPPER VOLTA 82.4 MALAW I -50.38
ALGERIA 599.07 EL SALVRDP 7C.81 KUWI4fT -61.4
INDIR 592 IAORCHSCAP 72.61 TAN-ZHN IA -65.22
HONDUPAs 492.C J3 GURTEMALA 71.7%J MOZAMBIOUE -70.56
0DMINICAN PEP 478.51 NICRPRGUIA 6b. a3? BOLIVIA -140.44
REUNION 473.45 ECUADOP 64.63 JAMRTCR -159.26
SOMHLIA 2G5.43 MHLI 62.53 OT'RD ." T'G) -230.1
IVORY C0[10T 271.89 RNGIJLH 53. ?2 SENE*-HL -286-94
COLOMBi 266.41 5IERLE NE 5 -71 GHANH 1 -343.95
HFGHAN ISTHN 254.34 BHRBH05DI 53.38 SPI LHNKA -362.86
MAURITANIA 252.32 KENYA 52.10 BRNCL.ROEH -565.54
WBR -61 5. 23
ua.Junt*ri e:; in the 19'70' FR!) Pomrle 19C834.
TABLE 1-8. AGGREGATE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PURCHASING POWER AND OOLLAR COST OF AGRICULTURAL
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1970-79. ($ million, 1970 prices
BRRZIL
IVORY COAST
CUBA
COLOMBIA
INDONESIA
THAILAND
GUATEMALR
EL SALVADOR
NICRRAI.UR
SENRGAL
BOLIVIA
COSTA PrICA
MRLAWI
COMEROON
KENYA
ECUADOP
RNHNOR
KUWAIT
MRUP [ TIUS
CHAD
BARBADOS
SUPINHME
TR INIRIlA
AFGHANI STH 4
IPHN
PRPHGUAY
JRMA I r o
2735.37
2005.04
1971.09
1203.9
1383.26
1301.05
1201.23
770.34
467.413
473.94
372 -
313.67
312.84
309.38
304.31
210.45
178.02
150.63
144.96
101.25
81.35
75.19
58. 1753.17'. 7:.. 1
30.903
27. e2
C-36
---- -------------------
ource: FAfi, gricurur:1 Prices and E.purt E.iring-.: i.h E:::pri enc of dev i ru nj
C'untries in the 197 c:, FRF1 Rui 1P.. 1
------------------------------------
GUYANA
CENT.AF.REP
DOMINICAN REP
GAMBIA
INDIA
TUNISI A
MARTINIQUE
UPPER VOLTA
SIERRA LEONE
MALI
GHANA
BURMA
GUROALOUPE
CONGO
ETH IOP I
LIBERIA
CYPRUS
TOGO
BENIN
SOMAL I A
MADAGASCAR
TANZAN IA
HONOUPAS
MHtRITANTA
IRAQ
SYRIA
1.1
-12.25
-26.65
-42.12
-45.13
-55.63
-56.8
-66.54
-74.8
-98.52
-90.81
-123. 13
-126.59
-161.5
-175.29
-180.55
-194.32
-216.02
-242.2
-242. 75
-246.06
-256.02
--271. 133
-314.61
-341.51
-349. 18
PANAMA
NIGER
REUNION
JORDAN
BANGLADESH
SRI LANKA
SUDAN
MOZAMBIOUE
URUGUAY
ZAMBIR
LEBANON
VENEZUELA
UGANDA
ANGOLA
ARGENTINA
ZAIRE
PHILLIPINES
PERU
SRUDI ARRBIR
MOROCCO
PRK-,I STAN
ALGEPIA
KORER REP
NIGEPIA
MEXICO
EGYPT
-392.99
-459.85
-555.51
-568.69
-581.67
-617.77
-638.36
-684.3
-703.74
-742.42
-762.70
-701. 16
-707.32
-885.75
-1035.37
-1132. 33
-1447.09
-1552.92
-1590.04
-1624. 55;
-1766.04
-1862.95
- 2002. 56
-354.2
36 12.59
-7134.11
for LDCs.'1 Table 1-6 shows the aggregate increases in the
purchasing power of agricultural exports for the 79
countries in the study. Fully one-half of the countries
experienced negative changes.
Table 1-7 shows the aggregate change in the cost for
agricultural imports of the 79 countries. Only 19 countries
were able to lower their agricultural import cost.
Combining the two previous tables we get Table 1-8
which shows the aggregate difference between changes in
purchasing power and cost of agricultural imports.
Significantly, two-thirds of the 79 countries in the study
experienced a net rise in import costs over purchasing
power. In this scheme success means countries have been
able to increase agricultural exports without requiring
additional imports, or to maintain the stability of imports
with out reducing export value. Unfortunately, for the
majority of the countries in the study,
"..domestic agriculture has been unable to
keep up with the additional demands placed on
it as earner of foreign exchange for the
import of food, oil and other products." 12
Thus, a significant number of countries continue to
face food security hazards because domestic agriculture is
weakening vis-a-vis the world commodity market.
Food Power
When a country appraises the capabilities of the
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international marketplace to ensure its food security it
must go beyond economic considerations. Theoretically, the
abundance of food in the international market, and the fact
that the variation of world production is low means that
when countries face internal shortfalls they can resort to
the world market to ensure supplies (or, given the
comparative advantage argument, even trade there permanently
instead of wasting resources on inefficient local
producers). However, in the era of nuclear weapons and
other military means that are expensive and sometimes overly
destructive and disruptive nations often find it attractive
to resort to the exercise of commercial power to further
their foreign policy objectives. The case of the U.S. ,
given its position of being the major world food exporter,
is especially interesting. We must note that,
"The use of food commodities in pursuit of
economic, diplomatic and strategic objectives
has long been important element of U.S.
foreign policy.'M
Food presents itself as an attractive weapon because of
its nature and the structure of the international food
trade. From the buyers point of view: 1) it is in short or
limited supply; 2) it is only in the hands of a few
producers; 3) it is in regular demand by competing
countries; 4) it is possible for the supplying countries to
control producers closely in order to regulate
accessibility; 5) relative to manufacturing products it has
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high short term substitution costs; 6) it is a life and
death commodity. 14
Nations that depend on the world market for their food
security can expect food exporters to exact concessions in
the diplomatic and economic sphere for assuring access to
their supplies. It is often argued that because the main
exporters of grain have divergent national interests they
cannot form a cartel comparable to OPEC and thus exert
extreme leverage on countries importing their food supplies.
This viewpoint misunderstands the concept of food security.
Sellers may seek to sell their food on a case by case basis
thus causing some kind of discrimination, and, given the
fact that the world market is essentially oligopolistic, any
one country can cause prices to rise, thus introducing price
fluctuations as described above.
In times of crisis producers will sell to the highest
bidders and to those who are more prepared to ally
themselves in their objectives. A country may be in neither
position and so face mass hunger (the ultimate fear of food
insecurity), or at least constraints on its national
development. The list of the use of food power is an
extensive one. There are recollections of the French method
of extortion in Francophone Africa, and the U.S. has not
hesitated to use P. L. 480 as an extension of the State
Department.
In economic analysis oligopolistic distortions are
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always achieved at the expense of efficiency, with the cost
predominantly being passed on to the consumer. Such is the
case in the international food market. In the food
exporting countries the market is under the control of
oligopolies. These firms are notorious for their practice
of being buyer, seller and intermediary for their own
products as they attempt to manipulate the grain market.
When we take into account that many of these Multinational
Corporations (MNCs) have annual revenues that are larger
than the GNP of many food importing countries, for many of
the latter food security is jeopardized by the power of the
former.
Macro-trends
So far food insecurity has been considered from the
standpoint of the nation acting at the international level.
Essentially, this dealt with the market place and the
mechanics of food as a commodity. To increase the value of
the analysis it is necessary to move beyond this to a higher
echelon. These larger issues are referred to as world
macro-trends. These result from cumulative occurrences
which have profound effect on the demand, supply and price
of food.
One disquieting macro-trend is the continual rise in
the world population despite efforts to slow it down. More
worrying is the fact that most of the growth is taking place
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in the LDCs, most of which are already food deficient. As
population growth continues unabated the effect on the
supply of and demand for food will be dramatic. Many
countries will find themselves unable to grow enough food or
to generate the necessary foreign exchange to feed their
populations. It would be left to the discretion of the food
surplus countries, and the response of the international
community in general, to decide their fate, providing their
is indeed enough food to go around.
Population growth puts huge pressures on the land.
Just when there is need for the land to be used for
productive purposes, nonproductive purposes increase. Not
only is good agricultural land converted to housing plots,
but allocation of resources must be diverted towards other
services for the growing population. Thus, short term
consumption becomes dominant at the expense of capital
formation for long term growth.
There is growing concern that the earth is undergoing
changes that will significantly affect the ability to grow
food. Not least among these concerns is the continual
destruction of the ozone layer. To a great degree the exact
impact of these changes can only be guessed at. However,
the very fact that there is uncertainty leaves room for
worry.
More importantly is the issue of the worldwide loss of
topsoil and cropland. In many countries the intensification
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TABLE 1-9. GROWTH IN IRRIGATED AREA, BY CONTINENT, 1950-85
TOTAL GROWTH IN IRRIGATED AREA (percent)
IRRIGATED
REGION AREA, 1985 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 1980-85
(million hectares)
ASIA (1) 184 52 32 28
NORTH AMERICA 34 42 71 14
EUROPE (3) 29 50 67 33
AFRICA 13 25 80 27
SOUTH AMERICA 9 67 20 28
OCEANIA 2 0 100 0
WORLD 271 49 41 26
(1) includes the asian part of the USSR
(2) this is for the U.S. only
(3) includes the European part of the USSR
Source : Lester Brown et al. State of the World, 1987. p 125
8
-11 (2)
9
13
17
0
8
of land use and the implementation of inadequate protective
measures aid the loss of valuable topsoil. At the same time
salination, overcropping, and the advance of the desert is
destroying previously fertile regions all over the world.
Since the 1960s most increases in agricultural
production has been dependent on water supplies from
irrigation schemes. In the macro-environment this resource
is becoming short in supply. Table 1-9 shows the slowing
down of increases in irrigated land since the 1950-60
period. In many countries less land is being irrigated due
to aquifer depletion, abandonment of waterlogged and
salinated land, reservoir silting, lowered water tables, and
the diversion of irrigation projects to non-agricultural
uses. Even if food prices continue to rise there will be
limits to the extent to which irrigation can contribute to a
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TABLE 1-10. WORLD FERTILIZER USE,
TOTAL AND PER CAPITA, 1950-86
YEAR TOTAL PER CAPITA
(million metric tons) (kilograms)
1950 14 5
1955 18 7
1960 27 9
1965 40 12
1970 63 17
1975 82 21
1980 112 26
1981 116 26
1982 115 25
1983 115 24
1984 125 26
1985 130 26
1986 131 26
Source: Lester Brown et al., State of the World
1987, p. 128
growth in food production.
Fertilizer use has become an intrinsic part of
agricultural production. As shown in Table 1-10, since 1950
world fertilizer use has risen by a multiple of nine, from
14 to 131 million metric tons. While this has contributed
to increases in agricultural productivity, the fact is that
there have not been a comparative response in production
over the period. Table 1-11 shows that the "response ratio"
declined from 46 in 1950 to 13 in 1986. Without major
advances in technology that will allow for a better
utilization of fertilizer by agricultural varieties the
response ratio is likely to stagnate at the low level. As
oil prices rise and the demand for byproducts other than
fertilizers increases, the use of fertilizers in agriculture
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TABLE 1-11. RATIOS OF WORLD GRAIN PRODUCTION TO
FERTILIZER USE, 1950-86
GRAIN FERTILIZER RESPONSE
YEAR PRODUCTION USE RATIO
(million metric tons)
1950 624 14 46
1955 790 18 43
1960 812 27 30
1965 1002 40 25
1970 1197 63 19
1975 1354 82 16
1980 1509 112 13
1981 1505 116 13
1982 1551 115 14
1983 1474 114 13
1984 1628 125 13
1985 1674 130 13
1986 1661 131 13
Source: Lester Brown et al., State of the World
1987, p. 130
is going to be at once limited and costly.
Overall, the use of energy in agriculture is increasing
tremendously without a corresponding increase in
agricultural production. The implication is that
agriculture has reached a saturation point. Table 1-12
shows total energy use by agriculture since 1950. In 1986
it took about three times the amount of energy used in 1950
to produce a ton of grain. In the presence of higher oil
prices and declining reserves food insecurity is going to
increase for a wide spectrum of countries unless innovative
production methods and rational economic policies are
introduced in the near future.
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TABLE 1-12. ENERGY USE IN WORLD AGRICULTURE, 1950-85
ENERGY USFO
TRACTOR IRRIGATION FERTILIZER OTHER TOTAL GRAIN TO PRODUCE A
YEAR FUEL FUEL MANUFACTURE ENERGY PRODUCTION TON OF GRAIN
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------(millionz of barrel of oil equival:nit) (million intric ton '(bar-els of oil equivalent)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1950 1-43 17 70 16 276 624 0.+4
1960 288 333 13731 C1i 54c5 F-41 0..65
1970 429 69 310 162 970 1093 0.89
1980 650 139 552 268 1609 1-123 1.13
19.5 739 201 6t. 317 1902 1667 1. 14
Sorc:Bol.Sat fheWold1----------------------------------------------------
Sour-cQ: LQor-Q Br-owin Pt al., S1tti oF tht World 9? p. 11 and p. 131.
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CONCLUSION
Food is the lifeblood of any society. A society unable
to feed itself is likely to soon decay. Throughout the ages
agriculture has set the pace of civilization. In the modern
era its role as a catalyst has not diminished. If anything
there is an overwhelming need for the reinstitution of
agriculture as an engine of growth. Unfortunately, the
obstacles before it are immense.
The growing interdependence of the global economy has
done little to sooth the fears of many countries that they
may be left behind in the march of development, and still
others have developed fears that their very survival and
independence may be
at stake.
In formulating national policies for food security one
can be easily tempted into the argument that Third World has
been failing because it is not competitive with the advanced
technology of the MDCs. Thus Third World countries should
concentrate on products in which their limited resources can
be better utilized. But the food security debate must be
raised beyond this level. In the absence of a concerted
effort to bolster local food supply systems the alternative
is surely an increase in periods of mass suffering and
decreases in national and international economic growth
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rates. As one observer has put it,
"There certainly is evidence to suggest that
the existing marketing systems are not
adequate to ensure international food security
for all countries alike, eve though available
supplies appear excessive."
Food deficit countries must make the judgement whether
they are prepared to turn to the outside world to secure
their food supply or place mare emphasis on the innovative
ability and responsiveness of their agricultural class.
Most LDCs are overwhelming rural societies and must come to
realize that,
"the expansion of the indigenous food
production capacity is the only viable long
term solution to chronic food deficits." 16
Many observers see the achievement of self-sufficiency
in food production as a function of a country's perception
of its role in world affairs. Thus, countries like Brazil
and India with aspirations of Great Power status will be
likely to emphasize self-sufficiency. This is the inverse
of reality. Those countries that are more powerful can in
fact leverage a kind of ransom on the world community to
ensure their food supply. No one can reasonable argue that
the Russians will rather have mass starvation than attempt
to gain access to food supplies by force if necessary.
In the event of an absolute world food shortage it is
likely that decisions will be made in terms of a country's
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ability to wage war, its regional and world importance, and
other such "size-power" considerations. Small countries
with little leverage will be the first to be abandoned.
Having laid the foundations of food security at the
national level it is now appropriate to focus the analysis
on the Caribbean Food and Nutrition Strategy and have this
point reintroduced in a more explicit manner. The task
before here is not to assume what the macro policy for the
region should be, but rather to determine the specifics of
achieving that policy once it has been decided upon.
Caribbean agriculture has been for centuries a catalyst of
growth for metropolitan centers, the question now is to what
extent it can ensure food security for its population.
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CHAPTER If
CHARACTERISTICS OF FOOD PRODUCTION AND
CONSUMPTION IN THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY
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INTRODUCTION
The past 20 years of Caribbean history has been the
story of an ailing region desperately seeking a relevant
model of economic transformation. Caribbeani economy as it
exists today is the remnant of four hundred years of
colonialism. The most striking feature of the modern
Caribbean is the limited structural transformation it has
undergone since slavery was abolished. The agricultural
structure itself has proven to be the most stagnant of all
sectors.
Despite gaining political independence in the 1960s the
region has failed to transform its general economic
structure. The economies of the region are still mono-
cultures dominated by a few primary industries geared
towards the export market. The dominant economic
institution remains the metropolitan owned multinational
corporation (MNC). Political independence has not brought
with it economic independence. Caribbean economy remains a
dependent economy, passively responsive to metropolitan
demand and metropolitan investment. While extractive
industries and raw commodity export are still the major
earners of foreign exchange, imports are comprised of
processed food products, manufactures and capital equipment.
The general economic stagnation has been coupled with a
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decline in agricultural activity. Although predominantly
rural (until recently, as we shall later see), Caribbean
economy has feared poorly in this area. Export production
is still the prime concern and the countries of the region
continue to depend on foreign imports for the bulk of
nutritional consumption. An attempt to decipher the sources
of rigidity inherent in the structure of Caribbean economy
is caught up in a multitude of factors. It is difficult to
perceive that the "Jewels of the Indies", once the mainstay
of the British Empire, have suffered from resource
insufficiency. While some may accept such an argument there
are general indicators that expose the inadequacy of such an
argument. In general the real source of stagnation has been
the failure of agriculture to be an "engine of growth".
Development theory, regardless of its ideological
background, has always attributed some role to agriculture
in the process of economic development. Generally, the
agricultural sector is expected to provide surplus labor for
the nascent industrial sector, generate foreign exchange
earnings for the import of capital goods, provide an
internal market for the new industries, and, most
importantly, contribute to the food supply of the growing
non-agricultural population. Caribbean agriculture has been
unable to conform in terms of this model. However, it must
be noted that for one brief period it appeared as if
agriculture would indeed provide the Rostovian "engine of
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growth". There is evidence to suggest that,
"During the second World War, when the
shipping lanes were blocked, the region was
able to go a long way towards feeding itself
through efforts founded on satisfying local
basic needs."
Since then it has followed a precipitous downhill path.
In the rest of this chapter an identification of the
fundamental structural rigidities of the agricultural system
will be undertaken. The influence on (and by) Caribbean
social trends and the economic malaise to which it has
contributed will be outlined. Finally, its implications in
terms of food security if presents trends continue will be
analyzed.
A word of caution is needed here before continuing. In
the following analysis the Caribbean countries are treated
as one generic area. It must be recognized that this is a
simplification of the region's diverse economic, political,
geographic and social makeup. However, this approach is
justified on two accounts. First, the current food
production problem is an analysis of a regional response to
a regional problem. Second, while the countries of the
region differ with each other in some respects, their
general configurations do not. The countries are all
subject to the same economic deformities and structural
weaknesses. As such this permits a generalized approach
without a discredit to the analysis.
* * * * * * * * *
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THE STRUCTURE OF AGRICULTURE
The predominant agricultural formation in the Caribbean
is the plantation. A remnant of the colonial era, the
plantation has shown itself to be flexible to changing
political circumstances without having to alter its basic
economic and social structure. The domination of the
agricultural system by the plantation also ensures that most
of the Caribbean economies suffer from the mono-culture
syndrome. Coupled with the plantation structure is the
large peripheral peasantry existing on marginal land and
engaged mainly in subsistence cultivation. Any policy to
revitalize agriculture in the region will inevitably have to
deal with this dualism so characteristic of Caribbean.
The two tiered structure of agriculture produces a
system that is grossly inefficient, and a production
rationale that is incompatible with the attainment of food
self-sufficiency within the region. Little headway has been
made in setting up a food producing system because the
plantation subordinates all their decisions to the
maximization of profits, while the peasantry is intent on
risk minimization. Technological stagnation in agriculture
sets in because the plantation is built on a mono-culture
that is resistant to capital innovations and immobilizes
large chunks of financial resources. On the other hand the
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small land owner has no capacity to initiate such
improvements. Land tends to be badly utilized. Large
tracts of land is left idle by the plantations while
countries in the region continue to suffer from production
shortages. At the same time the peasantry over-works
marginal land that contributes to environmental degradation.
Linkages with the rest of the economy are poorly developed.
The plantation is set up as an enclave economy that has more
linkages with the external world, while the peasantry is too
small economically to make a meaningful contribution to the
strengthening of linkages. The end result is a system where
the ultimate irony exists with energy deficient workers
laboring to export energy rich foods.
Caribbean agriculture is an agriculture built on the
foundations of dualism. On the one hand there are the large
plantations producing export crops, while on the other there
is the peasantry with limited capacity to produce surplus
food for the market. Table 2-1 shows the distribution of
agricultural land in the region. The structure is one such
that the majority of the agricultural class is found on
small plots, while the plantations though few in number
occupy most of the land. The unequal distribution of land
is summed up in Table 2-2. This shows that in all of the
countries the plantations represent a small number of
landowners although they own a disproportionate amount of
land. However, there is more to the dichotomy than
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expressed in the numbers. The present land distribution
scheme has its foundation in the colonial era. Thus, not
only do plantations dominate in size, but they tend also to
occupy the most fertile soils. In general this results in a
squeeze on the peasantry such that,
"it appears that opportunities for peasant
production have become increasingly restricted
with the expansion of plantations on the o e
hand and population growth on the other.'
Effects of the Plantation System
Instead of being an asset to economic transformation
the plantation system of the Caribbean endures as an
inefficient user of resources and a drain on the regional
economy. There are fundamental reasons for this. First, as
already explained plantations have historically occupied the
most fertile lands. However, most of it is regularly left
idle for extended periods. The motive behind the holding of
large tracts of land are varied. The aim is mainly an
attempt to keep out competitors, control the right of away
to other profitable tracts, and speculate on the future
profitability of presently unused tracts. Even where
governments undertake limited land reform it is usually the
most unproductive plantations, occupying the worst soils,
that are acquired in the process. Politically, large tracts
increase the power of the plantations and can contribute to
accounting flexibility for tax purposes, or in cases of
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nationalization, to increase compensation claims. Thus,
"the under utilization of land in plantation
economies are structural phenomena that inhere
in the system itself." 4
This behavior by the plantations continues the
marginalization of the peasantry. Since they exist on the
poor quality soils the peasantry is limited in its capacity
to be a serious contributor to the regions food production
problem. As such,
"the existence of low agricultural
productivity among peasants in the plantation
[dominated] economy is due more to a
reflection of the poor quality and
insufficient quantity of the land whigh the
farmers are forced to work with..."
The second factor that makes plantations a burden on
the regional economy is that they tend to monopolize the
credit market. Internally, the large size and influential
role of the plantations affords them ready access to the
credit market whether for capital expansion or speculative
purposes. Externally, many plantations are linked either
directly or indirectly with metropolitan concerns which
gives them ready access to the international capital market.
As such, regional governments are limited in their influence
over the plantations and the ability to enforce
diversification when warranted. The domination of the
credit market by the plantations means that little of the
capital earmarked by public and private agencies for
agriculture is left over for use by the peasantry.
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Third, plantation production is predominantly export
production. Therefore, the regions most productive land is
geared towards the production of luxury agricultural exports
such as sugar, coffee, spices and cocoa. Most of the export
is undertaken in the commodities' unprocessed form. The
domination of agriculture by the plantation system also
manifests itself in the agro-industrial sector. It leaves
only a small, largely undeveloped, infrastructure for
generating a local agro-industrial sector, and thus the
linkages between agriculture and industry is tenuous at
best.
With the agricultural infrastructure geared towards
export agriculture the peasantry itself suffers from the
demonstration effect. The peasantry, lingering on the edge
of the plantations, are predisposed to participate in this
endeavour because the plantation offers a ready market for
their produce. By this process, not only does the peasantry
become dependent on the plantations, but also the
agricultural system as a whole tends to be less diversified
and more concentrated in one crop. Even under conditions
where there is growing internal demand for food products
that can be cultivated regionally the plantation (and the
dependent peasantry) cannot respond. Because it is built
primarily for the diversion of domestic resources for
external satisfaction, and because it responds only to
external stimuli, the system is internally inflexible. This
52
rigidity is reinforced by the fact that many plantations are
parts of vertically integrated corporate structures where
forging of output prices is an inherent practice, warping
the operation of market forces and making them less
effective in signalling the need for adjustment and
alteration.
Fourth, the plantation exists on a system of subsidies
nd preferences. Many schemes have been undertaken to grant
subsidies to the agricultural sector in the form of
subsidies on fertilizers and energy. In general the
peasantry is much less a user of fertilizers and energy
intensive inputs than the plantations, so that the effect is
more to subsidize foreign consumption than to target
internal deficiencies.
In Caribbean economy the plantation are major
employers. Thus, with the existing unemployment problems
governments seeking short run solutions are forced to make
significant concessions in the form of tax breaks and
lowered tariffs to insure that plantations survive despite
their inefficiency and the need for general restructuring.
On the demand side, most plantation crops are traded under
systems of preferences from metropolitan countries. A good
example of this is the Lome Convention which governs trade
in Sugar, Cocoa, Coffee and other crops between the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the Asian, Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) countries. On the other hand the peasantry is
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afforded no such luxury, they have no protected markets,
either internally or externally. They are vulnerable to the
vagaries of the market while bearing the full affliction of
production and marketing risks themselves.
Although they are the main producers of food for the
domestic market the constraints on the peasantry is such
that at most times peasants are hardly able to devote
themselves fulltime to the process of food production. Most
rural inhabitants find themselves needing to work either as
tradesmen or on the nearby plantations for part of the year.
This process of "stagnant labor migration" is a direct
result of the marginalization of the peasantry. As
Beckford puts it,
"the existence of open unemployment and
underemployment as revealed in peasant
production and the petty trades in all
plantation economies is a reflection of a
st ruc t ur condition that inheres in the
system.'
Overall, the dominance of the plantation sector in
the rural economy contributes not only to the retardation of
agriculture but, especially in a region like the Caribbean
where society is predominantly rural, also contributes to
the stagnation of the entire economy. It is safe to
conclude that a plantation economy will be accompanied by
persistent and expanding unemployment as population grows,
low levels of national income, an unequal distribution of
income, an under-utilization of land, extreme under-
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consumption by the general population and inefficiencies in
production. These are the characteristics of Caribbean
economy.
* * * * * * * *
THE PERFORMANCE OF AGRICULTURE
Caribbean agriculture has not only failed to keep pace
with population growth but in many instances the output has
in fact declined. The most important characteristic is the
failure to diversify. The continuation of the plantation
system has ensured the continuation of mono-cultures. In
none of the countries does domestic food production exist as
the largest agricultural sector. All the major crops are
for external trade and are plantation products. The
continuation of the mono-culture syndrome is a direct
reflection of the intractable nature of the plantation
system and its failure to respond to the needs of the local
economy. The following analysis must be understood within
the context of the mono-culture syndrome, the dominance of
plantation agriculture and the limited capacity for change
within the system as it exists.
Land Utilization
The general picture in land utilization shows that
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despite the increases in the demand for food in the region,
and despite the presence of vast tracts of arable land there
has been little expansion of cropland. Table 2-3 shows the
limited nature of the expansion of cropland in the region
since 1966. Summing up the data we find that between 1974-
76 and 1985 permanent cropland in the region as whole have
actually diminished.
The actual utilization of available cropland adds
credence to the fact that the regions most land is tied up
TABLE 2-3. PERMANENT CROPLAND IN THE CARIBBEAN.
SELECTED YEARS. ('000 HECTARES)
1966 1976 1981 1985
ANTIGUA 3 3 3 3
BAHAMAS 13 14 14 14
BARBADOS -- -- - -
BELIZE 11 7 7 10
DOMINICA 10 10 10 10
GRENADA 14 14 9 9
GUYANA 10 15 15 15
JAMAICA 50 60 60 62
MONSTERRAT 1 1 1 1
ST KITTS 6 6 6 6
ST LUCIA 10 12 12 12
ST VINCENT 4 5 4 4
TRINIDAD 82 87 88 46
Source: FAO, PRODUCTION YEARBOOK, SEVERAL YEARS
in luxury production. Plantations crops, sugar, coffee,
cocoa and bananas are very land intensive crops. It must
also be recalled that in the Caribbean they tend also to be
situated on the most fertile land. In most cases
transformation of these tracts is very difficult to
undertake. The tracts are usually foreign owned, and given
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their preferential markets they appear to be more profitable
(at least in the short run) than if used for food
production. The issue of nationalization is also a very
thorny policy in the diplomatic sphere.
In accounting for the failure to extend croplands it
should be noted that the structure of Caribbean agriculture
mitigates against the class most likely to undertake such a
process, the peasantry. Its ability to hedge against risk
is quite limited, and the necessary financial and
technological resource flows aid its development are also in
very short supply.
Agricultural Output
The decline in agricultural output has occurred in most
commodities in the region, whether plantation or peasant
crop. Figure 2-4 the output of selected commodities in the
region with three year averages from 1970 to 1984. As the
data show, stagnation and decline seems intrinsic to the
region's agricultural sector. It is important to note
however, that the vegetable sector has shown steady
increases over the period. This sector is primarily in the
domain of peasant production. Despite the deterioration of
the region's agricultural base, the peasantry have shown the
ability to adopt and respond to changes in the regional
market.
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TABLE 2-4 AVERAGE OUTPUT OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, IN THE CARIBBEAN SELECTED PERIODS
METRIC
COMMODITY TONS 1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-
MILK 000 104 103 100 99
COFFEE
AND COCOA 00 189 188 169 127
COPRA 00 479 396 295 190
VEGETABLES 00 - 944 1178 1498
TUBERS 000 690 677 875 846
MAIZE 00 287 355 345 292
EGGS 000 17 17 19 15
FISHERIES 000 44 59 52 48
SUGAR 000 1157 1022 1406 1258
RICE 000 212 311* 303 289
* 1975 only
Source: FAO, PRODUCTION YEARBOOK, VARIOUS YEARS.
UNECLAC, AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS CARIBBEAN CC
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A more general picture of agricultural performance is
afforded by Tables 2-5, 2-6, 2-7 and 2-8. Using 1979-1981
as a base period the tables shows an index of agricultural
performance for the period 1976 to 1987 for selected Caricom
countries with comparative data for Africa, Asia and the
World. Table 2-5 shows total agricultural performance in
1987 in Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad was below the 1976
levels. Only Jamaica showed any improvement. The general
picture (when the fluctuations are factored out) is one of a
continual decline in agricultural production in the region.
The World, African and Asian average rate of increase is
well above the regional performance. This occurs despite
the problems of agriculture in the African and Asian
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TABLE 2-5. CARIBBEAN PRODUCTIVU I TY INDEX, 1977-87
WITH lOMPARRTIVE FI GUPES
1979 - 81 = 100
RG.RICUL TURE TOTRL
1976 1977 1978 1979 19P0 981 1982 1903 1984 9151  1906 1987
BARBADOS 84.13 92. 75 10. 32 97. 07 108. 81 94.12 85. 84 79.96 84.36 32.3 88. 24 74. 49
GUYANA 99.01 87.47 109.8 100.15 96.07 103.78 102.45 93.04 87.67 89.06 90.61 89.11
JRMRICA 95.33 98.67 113.92 105.68 91.3 96.02 94.1 102.U2 110.82 110.82 110.56 113.38
TRINIDAD 135.19 129. 49 119. 24 105.99 99. 01 95 89. 21 104.17 86. 65 104.41 103.23 102. 21
AFRICA 93.61 93.41 97.57 98.3 99.05 102.65 105.81 105.62 111.48 114.13 115.25 115.54
ASIA 87.28 90 95.49 96.71 99.35 103.94 108.35 114.72 120.85 123.15 125.68 126.35
WORLD 91.46 93.41 97.57 98.3 99.05 102.65 105.81 105.62 111.48 114.13 115.25 115.54
Source: FFR0, MONTHLY STATISTICAL BULLETIN, FEB 1988.
TABLE 2-6. CARIBBEAN PRODUCTIVITY INDEX, 1976-1987
WITH COMPARATIVE FIGURES
1979 - 81 = 100
FOOD TOTAL
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
BARBADOS 84.13 92.75 90.32 97.07 108.61 94.12 85.84 79.96 84.36 82.31 88.24 74.49
GUYANA 99.13 87.52 109.91 100.18 96.04 103.77 102.5 93.11 87.84 89.24 90.8 89.23
JAMAICA 95.21 99.47 114.78 105.52 98.7 95.78 93.78 101.99 110.52 109.75 111.84 112.9
TRINIDAD 135.87 129.73 119.65 105.88 99.33 94.79 89.74 105.95 88.54 105.01 104.93 k03.41
AFRICA 93.39 92.94 96.02 96.74 100.34 102.92 104.18 101.27 102.29 112.04 116.66 116.35
ASIA 87.33 89.87 95.39 96.79 99.48 103.73 107.62 114.56 119.61 122.07 126.16 126.44
WORLD 91.71 93.22 97.66 98.35 99.24 102.41 105.83 105.77 111.29 113.79 115.92 115.73
Source:---FAD,-MONTHLY---STATISTICAL----ULLETIN---FEB--1988.
TABLE 2-7. CARIffEAN PRODUCTIVITY INDEX, 1 977-87
W ITH COMPARATIVE FIGURES
1979 - 81 = (10
AGPICULTUPE PER C:APITA
197r6 977 1978 1 979 18 0 1981 19132 1983 1 984 i 1985 1 96 1. 907
BRRPBROS 84.41 93.5 90.68 97.46 100.81 93.74 H5.15 79.32 83.15 81.01 1-6.16 72.45
GUYANA 107.54 93.14 114.52 102.23 96.03 101.73 98.42 37.63 80.97 80.8 C0.77 78.06
JAMAICA 100.19 102.42 116.79 107.03 90.32 94.65 91.43 97.72 104.63 102.87 103.89 103.24
TRINIDAD 144.13 135.8 123.05 107.65 98.9 93.45 86.35 99.26 81.29 96.37 93.78 91.42
AFRICA 105.44 102.23 102 99.74 100.46 99.8 97.98 92.92 91.13 96.73 97.33 94.72
ASIA 94 95.13 99.09 93.51 99.34 102.15 104.66 108.92 112.76 112.94 113.4 112.17
WORLD 98.06 98.42 101.03 100.03 99.04 100.94 102.33 100.46 104.28 105 104.33 102.91
S~~~ F~~~-MORNTHL~STAI-TiC-LE~LEEIN,~FEB-98~~~- -- ~~
TABLE 2-8. CARIBBEAN PRODUCTIVITY INDEX, 1976-1987
WITH COMPARATIVE FIGURES
1979 - 81 = 100
FOOD PER CAPITA
1976 1977 1978 1979 1930 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
BARBADOS 84.81 93.5 90.68 97.46 108.81 93.73 85.15 79.32 83.35 81.01 86.16 72.45
GUYANA 107.67 93.2 114.63 102.27 96 101.73 98.47 87.69 81.14 80.97 80.94 78.17
JAMAICA 100.6 103.24 117.67 106.87 98.72 94.41 91.12 97.69 104.35 102.12 102.48 101.,91
TRINIDAD 144.85 136.06 123.47 107.54 99.22 93.24 86.86 100.95 83.06 96.93 95.33 92.49
AFRICA 105.19 101.63 101.92 99.67 100.35 99.98 98.29 92.8 91.03 96.81 97.82 94.66
RSIR 94.05 95 98.98 98.59 99.46 101.94 103.95 108.76 111.6 111.94 113.83 112.25
WORLD 98.33 98.22 101.12 100.07 99.23 107.7 102.35 100.6 104.11 104.68 104.93 103.08
------ e: NAO ~-MNTHLY~STAISI R-BLETI-N~FEB 1988~ ~~~-~~ ~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~ ~~
countries. By all accounts Caribbean agriculture is ailing.
Checking for the production mix, Figure 2-6 shows the
production index of food for the same period. Guyana and
Barbados have shown little changes from their 1976 levels
while Trinidad and Jamaica have shown modest increases. The
case of Trinidad is a particularly interesting one. The
fact that general agricultural production is falling while
the production of food is rising points to a production mix
favoring food crops in the country's agricultural sector
despite the general decline. In Guyana food production has
fallen at a faster rate than general output, while
Barbados's food output decline nearly equals the general
decline in agricultural output. By this index only Jamaica
has shown the slightest success. It should be noted that
Jamaica is the only country that has undertaken a large
scale attempt at land redistribution and increased emphasis
on the agricultural sector in general and the peasantry in
particular (under the Manley administration from 1972 to
1980).
Tables 2-7 and 2-8 are per capita data for the two
indexes. An examination of this data show that the region's
agricultural sector has categorically failed to keep pace
with population growth. Again only in Jamaica was there
some marginal rate of change above the population growth
rate. This data point to the increasingly perilous
situation in the region's ability to feed itself.
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Agriculture in the General Economy
In analyzing the plantation structure dominant in
Caribbean agriculture the lack of meaningful linkages with
the rest of the economy was alluded to. Agriculture has
failed not only to develop linkages but its role in the
macro economy has continued to shrink. Caribbean economy
has grown slowly in the past 25 years, but more importantly
the rural sector, although demographically the largest
sector in the economy, has failed to keep pace with the
modest growth rates of the general economy.
Table 2-9 shows agriculture's contribution to Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) for the period 1974 to 1983 for
selected Caricom countries for which data is available. The
general picture is one of relative decline in the
agricultural sector as a contributor to GDP. Except for
Antigua and St Vincent agriculture's share of GDP in the
economy has declined. However, in several countries,
notably Grenada and Jamaica it still remains a large part of
the economy. While this index does not give the absolute
magnitude of agricultural decline it presents a useful
picture of the decreasing role of agriculture in the
regional economy. Recognition of the fact that the regional
economy has been growing ever so slowly bolsters the
argument that agriculture is dying in the region.
As a source of employment the agricultural sector has
continued to become less important. Table 2-10 shows the
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percentage of the total economically active population
occupied in agriculture for selected Caribbean countries for
the period 1965 to 1983. In all cases the percentage of the
TABLE 2-9. AGRICULTURE'S CONTRIBUTION TO GDP AT FACTOR COST
IN CARICOM, 1974 - 1983. (PERCENT)
COUNTRY 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
ANTIGUA
BAHAMAS
BARBADOS
BELIZE
DOMINICA
GRENADA
GUYANA
JAMAICA
MONSTERRAI
ST KITTS
ST LUCIA
ST VINCENT
TRINIDAD
7 8 8.9 8.2 7.8 6.8 6.4 7.3 7.2 8.2
- -- 4.6 4 4.3
10.7 13.3 9.7 10.5 9.4
23.53
3
2
1
2.9 37.2
24.9 28.7
30 31.1
7.1 7.3
10.4 5.2
4.7 10.5
9.7 15.5
2.3 14.9
3.4 3.2
24.4 26.
40.5 41
34.9 3
23
7.9
5.3
20.6 21
14.5 13
19.7 19
3
3
9.2 9.8 7.6 6.9 6.9
26 24.7 31.4
.4 44.1 39.9 38.2 30.7
3.1 30 31.9 26.2 ---
20.8 22.6 22.3 23.4 22.2
8.4 7.9 7.2 8.1 7.5
4.7 4.7 5.2 4.1 4.7
.2 18.5 - 20.5 15.6
.4 14.4 14 14.6 13.8
.5 19 15 13.7 17.8
2.8 2.7 3.1 2.3 2.3
30.7 30.2
23.4 24.2
6.8 6.6
4.8 4.4
20.2 ---
14.4 15.9
17 ---
2.5 2.5
SOURCE: UNECLAC,
VI, 1984
Agricultural Statistics: Caribbean Countries,
the labor force in agriculture has declined since 1965.
However, the data show that the percentage of the labor
63
Vol
0.4
force in agricultural in Jamaica and Guyana has increased
between 1980 and 1985.
When an analysis for the countries shown both in Tables
2-9 and 2-10 several processes become evident. First, the
percentage of the labor force employed in agriculture has
declined more slowly than agriculture's contribution to
GDP. Second, from the early 1970s agriculture contributed
more to employment than its relative contribution to GDP.
Third, when factors one and two are combined the precarious
nature of the agricultural sector is more apparent. The
fact that agriculture makes a relatively larger contribution
to the labor force than it does to GDP means that returns to
the agricultural sector, and thus the standard of living,
TABLE 2-10 PERCENT OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
IN AGRICULTURE FOR SELECTED CARIBBEAN
COUNTRIES, SELECTED YEARS.
COUNTRY 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
--------------------------------------------
BARBADOS 23.2 20 18.1 16.4 8.1
GUYANA 32.5 28.1 24.8 21.7 24.5
JAMAICA 34.2 29.5 24.8 20.7 29.1
TRINIDAD 20.1 18.6 17.2 16 8.5
Source: FAO, PRODUCTION YEARBOOK, VARIOUS YEARS.
is lower than returns in the general economy. The data
demonstrates that Caribbean rural economy is a marginalized
existence.
In Caribbean economy sectoral decay manifests itself
not by a flight from a high wage contracts but rather in the
64
existence of lower wages. Standard economic theory (and the
Marxist theory for the new international mobility of
capital) holds that as one sector continues to have higher
wages its position is likely to become precarious as capital
flees this sector for other sectors where the concentration
of capital is lower. A good example of this phenomenon has
been the decay of the U.S. steel industry in the 1960s and
1970s, juxtaposed with the rise of fast-food enterprises
based on the cheap labor of the inner city. Of course the
process of agricultural decline in the region is a makeup of
more complicated factors. The depressing effect of the
plantation structure has already been pointed out. The
price fluctuations for Caribbean agricultural products in
the international marketplace, the riskiness of agricultural
endeavors, and the low productivity of Caribbean agriculture
in general (because of low capital inputs), and poor peasant
production (because of poor soil and technological
conditions) must also be recognized.
Agriculture's decline has impoverished whole sectors of
Caribbean rural society, but the effect has also
disseminated to other sectors of the society as well. In
particular the burden has been felt in the process of
urbanization. The impact of agriculture on this sector has
been so pronounced that it warrants special attention.
* * * * * * * *
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THE URBANIZATION PROCESS
With the decline of the rural economy a multitude of
push factors develop to propagate rural displacement. The
impoverishment of the rural population inevitably leads to
an exodus as attempts to raise the standard of living result
in migration to the urban areas that are perceived to be
better off. In the urban areas wages in industrial and
service jobs are general higher than the existing wage
structure in the rural economy and they have the added
advantage of offering more regular remuneration. Social
amenities such as health and education are more regularly
available, and the shedding of the stigma of agricultural
work can be achieved.
In analyzing the process of rural flight, its
contribution to urban growth and the national effect that
both entails, certain fundamental mechanisms can be
distinguished. First, there is the rural decline as
described above. Second, there is the higher standard of
living in the urban areas that serves as a magnet for the
more depressed rural folk. Third, due to the rural influx
into the urban areas the need to divert the already limited
national resources to the seemingly more urgent problem of
urban growth develops. Finally, the previous three phases
interact among themselves to form a vicious circle of
retardation of the attempt at national economic development
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and structural transformation. Having already developed the
first point there is need to expand on the latter three.
The Rising Urban Population
By any standard urban growth in the Caribbean has been
very rapid. Until 1960 the vast majority of the population
could be classified as rural. However, as the standard of
living in the rural areas has continued to decline so has
its depopulation continued unabated. Table 2-11 shows the
percentage of the total population classified as urban and
the urban growth rates for four selected Caribbean
countries. The Table shows that in 1960, of the four
countries, Barbados had the highest urban population
at 41 percent. However, by 1980 the lowest urban population
was 46 percent in Barbados and as high as 69 percent in
Jamaica. The region as a whole moved from 38 percent to 52
percent urban during the period. Projections indicate that
the urban population is likely to reach 64 percent of total
population by 2000.7 The overall urban growth rate is a
graphic description of the internal dynamics of the rural
sector. For the entire region rural population growth since
1960 has been at less than one percent, while the urban
growth rate has been consistently over three percent per
annum. The data are displayed in Table 2-12. It points to
the fact the flight from the rural sector has been a
tremendous source of urban growth as being experienced in
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TABLE 2-11. PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION DEFINED AS URBAN, AND
GROWTH RATES FOR SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, (1960-82)
PERCENTAGE URBAN URBAN GROWTH
COUNTRY -------------------- RATE (1960-1982)
1960 1970 1982
BARBADOS 40.8 43.5 46.9 1.1
GUYANA 28.9 31.7 49.1 3.8
JAMAICA 34 41.6 77.6 7.1
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 39.2 53 68.1 3.8
CARIBBEAN 38.2 45.1 54
Source: K.R.Hope, URBANIZATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
the region. The rural influence is felt in two ways. In the
first instance there is movement from rural to urban areas by
the first generation of migrants. Here the influence is direct
TABLE 2-12. AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH OF URBAN AND RURAL
POPULATIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN FOR SELECTED PERIODS
URBAN GROWTH RATE RURAL GROWTH RATE
1950-60 1970-75 1980-90 1950-60 1970-75 1980-90
2.93 3.31 3.18 1.35 0.73 0.71
Source: K.R.Hope, URBANIZATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
and immediate. As an example of this movement Table 2-13
shows the percent of urban growth that can be directly
attributed to rural transfers for the period 1970 to 1975.
One can surmise that up to 50 percent of urban growth in
this period for the countries shown can be attributed to
rural migration. After this first order impact however,
there is a second process. The vast majority of migrants
tend to be young adult women. 8 Thus, migrants are usually
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those in their prime fertility periods. Through the
demographic multiplier they add a relatively high number of
members to the urban ranks, while less growth happens in the
rural areas.
TABLE 2-13. RURAL MIGRATION AS A SHARE OF URBAN GROWTH
FOR SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, 1970-75
(PERCENTAGES)
COUNTRY URBAN POPULATION SHARE OF GROWTH
GROWTH RATE DUE TO MIGRATION
GUYANA 6.8 51.01
JAMAICA 3.8 52.6
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 2 42.1
Source: K.R.Hope, URBANIZATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH
CARIBBEAN
The Impact of Urbanization
The rapid urban growth does not take place without
deleterious consequences to the national (and regional)
economy. The formation of a large urban population happens
at a much faster rate that the economic, social and
political fabric of the society can adjust to the changes.
As a result this disequilibrium within the national fabric
institutions and services stutter in their ability to
function properly.
Economically, the urban sector must provide jobs for
the growing population. However, it is usually not able to
do this. Not only is the rate of capital investment low,
but it also tends to be capital intensive despite the large
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pool of labor. In the Caribbean this is due to the strong
presence of the trade union movement and the relatively high
wages that exist in the region. In the face of high
unemployment and inflationary spirals the government is
usually forced to subsidize consumption. This presents
results in a drain on the national treasury. Taking into
account that a high percentage of consumption is based on
imports the impact is even more damaging.
Socially, there is a rise in crime and congestion.
Social amenities that proved so attractive at first begin to
decay. Schools, hospitals and other such services become
overcrowd and inoperative.
Politically, the worsening economic and social
conditions coupled with a concentrated population
distribution becomes volatile. For the immediate future
political expediency demands that scarce resources be
diverted to the urban malcontents. Instead of attacking the
problem at the source government policies become a stopgap
measure that serves only to exacerbate the situation as more
urban in-migration ensue.
Although rural to urban migration eases immediate
population pressures on the rural sector, agricultural
production remains engulfed in difficulties. The rapid
urbanization diverts away financial and technological
capital from the rural areas. Therefore, the process of
structural transformation in this sector is further
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prohibited. Important as this factor may be there is a
qualitative change that occurs in the rural areas that
proves to be more debilitating. This is the issue of rural
gentrification.
The majority of rural migrants tend to be in the
younger age groups. As such the older folk with less energy
are left to man the agricultural production process. The
Caricom Secretariat estimates that, "the average age of the
farmer is now probably over 60 years." 9  Even in instances
where there may be an available young population for
agricultural work the contradiction of rural areas having
high unemployment rates and labor shortages exists. The
stigma and relatively low wages existing in the agricultural
sector combine to make unemployment more acceptable than
agricultural labor to the young.
* * * * * * * *
FOOD SECURITY AND THE AGRICULTURAL DECLINE
From the analysis what emerges is a construct of
agriculture as a millstone in the region's development
process. Agricultural decay has proven expensive to the
fragile economies of the region. The plantation structure
has not only induced stagnation and decay in the economy,
but it has also thrust the burden of growth onto the urban
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sector. In the final analysis the question of food
production is a question of consumption, nutrition and
standards of living. In this regard the dismal agricultural
performance has contributed to general economic retardation.
Following from the larger definition of food security
proposed in Chapter One it becomes appropriate to illustrate
the exact nature of regional food insecurity. The
agricultural response (or lack thereof) to the growing
regional food crisis manifests itself in both the short and
long runs. In the short run the crisis presents itself in
the growing balance of trade deficits and its high food
import content. Implicit with this is the regional
dependence on external food sources and the economic hazards
that accrue from such an existence, together with the
negative implications for pursuing national self-
determination. In the longer run the effect is seen first in
the failure to achieve structural transformation, whether in
agriculture or the overall economy. And second, the
nutritional deficiencies of the regions population becomes
the expression of an inadequate and inappropriate food
supply.
The Balance of Payments Burden
Since 1960 the majority of the countries in the region
have shown a negative Balance of Trade. Table 2-14 shows
the appropriate data between 1960 and 1983 for Caricom
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TABLE. 2-14. BALRNCE )F PAYMENTS STATEMENT FOR CARICOM COUNTRIES, 1960 - 1983.
COUNTRY MILL INS 1960 1965 1971 1975 1 976 1977 197. 19 19 1980 1981 1982 1983
E. C. $ EX'POR TS 4.27 6.34
IMPORTS 15.63 32.4
H-0-P -11 . 36 -26. 06
DHMS & EXPORTS
I MPORT s
B-0-P
EBPADOS B' 00S $ EXIPORTS
IMPORTS
B-0-P
B'LZE * EXPORTS
I MPORTS
B-11-P
DOMINICA E. C. $ EXPORTS
IMPORTS
B-0-P
GRENADA
GUYANA
JAMAICA
MONSTERAT
EXPORTS
IMPORTS
8-0-P
EXPORTS
IMPORTS
B-l-P
EXPORTS
IMPORTS
B-O-P
E.C. * EXPORTS
IMPORTS
B-0-P
ST LUCIA E.C. $ EXPORTS
IMPORTS
8-0-P
ST VINCENT
TRINIDAD
TOBAGO
E.C 
T.T 
EXPORTS
IMPORTS
B-0-P
EXPORTS
IMPORTS
B-0-P
ANTIGUA
BHHAMAS
125.1
147.3
-22.2
113.3
155
-41.7
0.273
19.79
-19.51
5.4
12.2
-6.8
5.8
13
-7.2
2.-6 59.92
72,65 145. 14
-45. 39 -"5. 22
19 39.6 2508.3
107 337.5 2696.9
-88 -247.9 -188.6
64.36 4;. 3
-52
174.6
349.9
--175.3
9.25
17.2
-7.7
165.8
180.1
-14.3
153.1
206.5
-53.4
0.272
4.89
-4.618
79.2 216.5
236 437.2
-156.8 --220.7
5.9
66.9
-61
40.9
83.3
-42.4
112.5
187.8
-75.4
6.2
10
-3.8
11.2 8.7
22 54.6
-10.8 -45.9
6.4 7.1
14.8 30.5
-8.4 -23.4
1204.0
1592.3
-383.3
24.6
45
-20.4
26.9
52.8
-25.9
858. 1
810.6
47.5
690.2
1021.4
-331.2
1.02
16.54
-15.52
35.4
100.4
-65
16.5
53.9
-37.4
491.3 690.5 960.6 3878.5
504 817 1084.9 3243.9
-12.7 -126.5 -124.3 634.6
23.61
911 .84
-68. 23
2992.3
3124.5
-132.2
173.6
473.3
--299.7
940.4
16;15. 1
-674.7
29.1
49.8
-20.7
34.1
66.3
-32.2
711.3
927.4
-216.1
572.8
029.8
-257
1.12
20.8
-19.68
49.9
125.7
-75.8
24.7
62
-37.3
5393.5
4026.9
566.6
17. l
92.9
-7?5. 2 ~
3260.7
31568. 2
-307.5
1932
545. 1
-352. 1
1241.6
1801.5
-559.9
32.3
59.1
-26.8
38.5
84.8
-46.3
661.8
804.3
-142.5
698.6
781.6
-83
1.64
18.93
-17.29
61
160.2
-99.2
27
31.9
--54.9
5231.5
4340.4
391.1
33. 05 27. 44
1:25 197.4
-91. 15 - 169. 96
3050.4
3149.6;
-91.2
261.1
628.2
-367.1
1604. 1
2129.9
-525.8
42.9
76.8
-33.9
, 5. -
96.5
-51.2
750.2
711.1
39.1
1142.5
1260
-117.5
3.71
26.93
-23.22
72.4
219.9
-147.5
44.3
97.7
-53.4
4895.1
4721.
174.1
3784
-201
1817. P.
2637.5
-819.7
25.4
60
-34.6
57.7
118
--60.3
746.4
810.2
-63.8
1445.8
1754.5
-308.7
2.05
32.32
-30.27
86
273.2
-187.2
39.9
125.1
-85.2
6265
5051
1214
74.99 102.87
262. 9 368.55
-1i07. 96 26. 8
4906
5507
-601
455.7
1064. 1
-608.4
2216.9
2995. 1
-778.2
26.3
128.7
-102.4
45.0
135.6
-89.8
991.6
1010
-18.4
1715
2086.7
-371.7
3.2
44.55
-41.35
124.4
334.3
-209.9
42.5
154.2
-111.7
9784.8
7626.4
2158.4
3515
4203
-- 688
391
1151.1
-760. 1
2380. 1
3239.3
-859.2
51.8
134.1
-82.3
50.3
144.9
-94.6
974.3
1236.5
-262.2
1735.1
262 3.4
-888.3
5.97
51.02
-45.05
112.3
347.2
-234.9
65.9
157.1
-91.2
9025.9
7498.9
1527
ni~~~~~~~~-- ;i-: ------: --------------.--T----T------------------~YF~~'Plfk' ~r-i 1~
313.4
-242.7
11.8
31.5
-19.7
12. 1
44.6
-32.5
265.6
268.2
-2.6
284.8
437.8
-153
0.451
8.8
-8.349
BELIZE
912.4
368F. 82
-276. 4e
2.160
3051
-591
528.6
11016. 1
-577. 5
1820.3
2560.0
-739.7
250811
3230
-649
717-4
1249
-531.6
1554.6
2235.9
-681.3
66
123.2
-62.2
50.1
150.9
-100.8
724
841.1
-117.1
1367
2460.3
-1093.3
51.1
150.2
-99.1
666
793
-127
1389.1
2817.1
-1428
7.25
5.46
1.79
112.3
318.3
-206
87.4
164.5
-77.1
7372.4
8873.1
-1500.7
5728.7
6138.6
-409.9
countries. The only country that has posted a positive
balance is Trinidad and Tobago and that is mainly due to its
hydrocarbon resources. The export sector of the region has
continued to grow. However, its rate of acceleration has
proven to be slower than the rate of growth of imports.
Although not the only source of the increasing
propensity to import, the region's food imports are a major
contributor to the worsening balance of trade. Table 2-15
shows the percentage of the import bill that was accounted
for by food imports between 1974 and 1983. On the surface
the picture presented is a mixed one. Generally, Jamaica,
Guyana and Trinidad shows that a rising percentage of their
import bill over the period is accounted for by food
imports. While all the others are more or less constant.
However, there are other factors to be considered. First,
the food content of the regional import bill is high both in
the relative and absolute sense, even in circumstances
where it has remained stable or declined slightly. Second,
Trinidad, Jamaica and Guyana are the
three largest countries. Thus, their impact on the regional
bill is going to be correspondingly higher. When the regional
food crisis first became evident in 1974 the regional food bill
stood at approximately $US 500 million, by 1980 it was estimate
to stand at $US One billion. 10 The rising food bill cannot be
attributed solely to increases in population. The per capita
food bill has risen by huge amounts during the period.
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TABLE 2-15. CONTRIBUTION OF FOOD IMPORTS IN TOTAL IMPORTS
FOR CARICOM COUNTRIES, 1974-1982 (PERCENTAGE)
COUNTRY 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
ANTIGUA
BAHAMAS
BARBADOS
BELIZE
DOMINICA
GRENADA
GUYANA
JAMAICA
MONSTERRA
ST KITTS
ST LUCIA
15.2 16.9 22.8 25.8 28.8
T
ST VINCENT
TRINIDAD
3.1 2.4
24.8 23.3
25.8 28.3
32.1 31.6
40.7 34.8
7.8 5.9
13.1 11.6
24.4 27.3
27.7 20.8
24.5 25.1
29.6 32.3
6.6 8.8
2.4
22.1
24.1
33.3
32.4
6.1
14
25
23.1
24
31.9
6.5
1.9 --
20.6 22.1
22.3 24.3
28.4
41.8 24.2 26.2
17.6
24
17.6
23.2
17 16.8
29 25 20 22 23.4
--- 
--- 29.3
8.1 8.8 7.7
6.7 19 6.5
27.5 23 21.3
23 24.5 21
20.2 20.6 19.1
28.1 32.7 32.3
8.4 9.3 10.6
28.9
6.2
6.2
20.9
19.1
18
30
9.3
28.2
5.9
15.6
25.3
19.5
20.4
27.5
11.2
27.5
8.4
16
24.5
19.5
21.1
29.2
10.2
Source: UNECLAC, AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS,
Vol VI, 1984.
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES,
Table 2-16 shows the per capita food import bill for
1970 and 1978 for Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad.
During the period per capita food imports more than
doubled for Barbados, almost tripled for Guyana and
increased by multiples of 4 and 5 for Trinidad and Jamaica,
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TABLE 2-16. PER CAPITA FOOD IMPORTS
FOR SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, 1970 AND 1978
COUNTRY UNITS 1970 1978
BARBADOS B $ 199 496.8
GUYANA G $ 46 134
JAMAICA J $ 34.5 177.3
TRINIDAD T $ 93.9 402
Source: F. Long, THE CARIBBEAN FOOD CRISIS,
Third World Quarterly, Vol 4 No.4, Oct. 1982
respectively. This increase is accounted for both by the
decrease in the internally produced food supply and the
increasing marginal propensity to import evident in the
regions changing consumption pattern.
The implications for national development are clear.
As the region's balance of payments difficulties continue to
increase, and even more the portion expended on imported
food consumption, its ability to finance structural
transformation will continue to be restricted. In the
longer term this is the worst manifestation of food
insecurity. Not only will opportunities for economic
development be circumscribed, but the ability to finance
growing food imports will be restricted in the face of
foreign exchange crises. The Caribbean countries will have
to depend on economic and food aid for their economic
survival. Regional economic well being will then have to be
accomplished with the brokage of regional self-
determination.
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Nutritional Deficiencies
The most explicit expression of food insecurity comes
in the form of the nutritional status of the population.
Inadequate supplies of vital nutrients are likely to present
health risks and limit the development of the human resource
base. In the Caricom region the nutritional status of the
population is rather precarious. Table 2-17 shows the per
capita intake of daily calorific and protein supplies in the
region for selected periods since 1964. It shows that
calorie intake has risen only very slowly since 1964. The
region lags below the world average and is only slightly
above the African average. For most of the period protein
intake has remained close to the 1964 level but has improved
substantially in the 1983-1985 period. However, it still
lags below the world average.
The nutrition hazards involved are reflected in the high
levels of malnutrition among infants in the pre-school
years. In 1982 this was accessed as affecting between 2 and
19 percent of the relevant population in the countries of
the region. Between 8 and 19 percent of all children are
born underweight which contribute to later health problems.
In the adult population there are complications arising from
low iron intake contributing to anaemia. Concurrently, the
obesity associated with the high levels of starch foods and
diabetes is very common. At the same time it has been
estimated that up to 70 percent of the male adults have
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TABLE 2-17. NUTRITIONAL INDICES. CALORIES AND PROTEIN PER CAPITA
FOR SELECTED PERIODS WITH COMPARATIVE DATA FOR SELECTED AREAS
CALORIES PER CAPITA
CARICOM
WORLD
AFRICA
ASIA
CARICOM
WORLD
AFRICA
ASIA
(number per day)
1964-66 1969-71 1974-76 1980-82 1983-85
2099 2208 2161 2267 1909
2413 2488 2522 2652 2666
2194 2239 2278 2391 2278
2039 2133 2186 2379 2437
PROTEIN PER CAPITA (grams per day)
1964-66 1969-71 1974-76 1980-82 1983-85
53.5
64.1
56.5
51.1
57.4
65.5
57.5
52.7
52.1
66.3
57.6
54
54.5
68.9
59.7
58.4
63.2
68.2
56.4
58.7
Source: FAO, PRODUCTION YEARBOOK, VARIOUS YEARS
very low energy intake and reserves. 1 1  Overall, there is a
problem with the food supply in the region. Of the countries
that are members of the Caribbean Food and Nutrition
Institute (CFNI) it has been estimated that,
"only about 44 percent of households..get
enough dietary engy, while 56 percent have
adequate protein. "
Therefore, not only is the food supply limited, but as
implied the sectoral and class differences so prevalent in
the region, its distribution is also skewed.
The absence of a constant and satisfactory supply of
food in the region it not only exposes it to international
weaknesses but also inhibits the internal development of the
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region. The process of regional development will depend
heavily on the ability of the agricultural sector to
contribute to economic transformation. Without an
agricultural input structural change is likely to be slow at
best, or non-existent at worse. On its own steam the export
sector has so far proven itself incapable of answering to
the rising expectations of the regions population. Food
insecurity in the Caribbean is both an issue of long term
national development, and the ability to feed the regions
population in the short run. As has been demonstrated the
region is in a food security crisis.
The following chapters involve a description of the
attempt to alter the agricultural decline of the region
through regional cooperation in the form of the Regional
Food and Nutrition Strategy, and a consideration of the need
to implement more realistic policies if the regions economic
development process is to begin in the near future before it
is too late.
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CHAPTER III
THE REGIONAL FOOD AND NUTRITION STRATEGY:
A POLICY FOR FOOD SECURITY
80
INTRODUCTION
The Balance of Payments difficulties and the rapid
decline in agricultural output experienced by Caricom
countries in the 1970s signalled the need for measures aimed
at agricultural rationalization to end the economic malaise.
The precarious world food situation outline in Chapter One
served as an impetus to highlight the need for agricultural
restructuring and improved performance. The gloomy world
picture operated as a backdrop to the catalyst to the
realization of the concept of food insecurity in the region.
Through a series of consultations at the technical,
Ministerial and Heads of Government levels the Regional Food
and Nutrition Strategy (RFNS) was developed as a programme
for concerted regional action to end the decline of the
1970s.
As early as 1975 (2 years after the signing of the
Chaguaramas Treaty creating Caricom) measures were initiated
for establishing,
"a specific plan for the increase of food
production, including fish, in the entire
Caribbean Community area designed to achieve
the greatest possible measjre of food self
sufficiency in the Region"
Through a series of studies and reports under the aegis
of the Caribbean Community Secretariat, the Caribbean
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Development Bank, and various international agencies the
Regional Food Plan (RFP) was formulated by 1976. It was
designed to target action at specific agricultural sectors
on a regional scale to offset the continuous agricultural
decline. In 1983 the RFP was incorporated into the Regional
Food and Nutrition Strategy. The RFNS differed from the
Regional Food Plan in that in addition to food production
schemes, it established policies for dealing with the
malnutrition problems of the Region, which themselves were a
direct consequence of the regional food imbalance. Thus, in
addition to addressing the agricultural question, the RFNS
addressed the necessary changes in health and education that
were to be implemented. The Caricom Secretariat reported
that,
"The RFNS, a natural extension of the Regional
Food Plan, was therefore developed with an
explicit recognition of the multi-disciplinary
demands of the exercise. Thus, it
incorporates all the elements of the Regional
Food Plan as well as jntroduces other
complementary areas".
The aim of this segment of the essay is to review the
specific nature of the RFNS and the measures initiated under
its policy perspective for dealing with regional food
security. The RFNS has several components, from research
and production to communications policies. However, the
analysis will be restricted solely to those parts that have
a direct bearing on food production and food security.
The rest of the Chapter is organized in the following
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manner. First, the stated premise of the Strategy in its
final form will be delineated. Second, an analysis of the
organizational structure and mechanisms for enacting the
Strategy will be undertaken. Third, other policies
initiated outside of the RFNS but are designed to increase
its effectiveness will be outlined. Fourth, a short
synopsis of the results of the Strategy so far will follow.
Most of this section will be contingent on the analysis in
the previous chapter. Finally, a critique of the Strategy
will be undertaken. The aim here will be to pinpoint
segments of the Strategy that are inconsistent with its
goals, discuss the implications of the designated policies
as a means of increasing food production and food security
in the Region, and outline crucial factors that need to be
incorporated into the Strategy. This will lay the
groundwork for introducing new approaches for regional
agricultural planning into the Strategy if it is to be
successful, which is the subject of Chapter 4.
* * * * * * * *
THE PREMISE OF THE STRATEGY
As originally conceived the Regional Food Plan was
designed to facilitate an increase in regional food
production as soon as possible. However, as studies were
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undertaken and the over ambitious nature of the Plan
realized, the focus changed to one that stressed the
structural nature of the problem and the need for long term
planning. It was also recognized that the idea of total self
sufficiency may not only have been undesirable, but may also
have been uneconomical and wasteful. The RFNS in its final
form introduced policies calling for both short term
increases in agricultural production, and the need for long
term alteration of the structural difficulties facing the
Regions's agricultural sector. The Caricom Secretariat
stated that,
"The RFNS has as its goals increased economic
self-efficiency and self-reliance and the
improved health status of the people of the
Caribbean. Moreover, one of the major aims of
the Strategy was to bring about a reduction of
the incidence of malnutrition ind reduced
dependence on imported food" 3 .
Specifically, an attempt was made by the Strategy to
delineate the areas where improvements were to be
forthcoming. The aim was to introduce policies in several
major sectors of the economy that would foster an
improvement in the agricultural sector and the status of the
consumers. Overall, the Strategy's major emphasis would be
in the following areas:
1. Agricultural production and Agro-industry
11. Research and Technology
llI. Post-harvest Activities
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IV. Provision of Management Services
V. Assistance to Small Farmers
VI. A Disaster Preparedness Plan
VI1. Targeting Specific Sectors
Agro-industrial Development
The foremost task of the Strategy was to increase
agricultural production in the Region. The aim here was to
allow the agricultural sector an opportunity to blossom and
play a larger role in the economic development of the
Region. Thus, production in all agricultural commodities,
including import substitutes, import replacements, and
exports was to be boosted. Essentially, this would allow
for a reversal of the balance of trade problems, not only
through an increase in exports, but also from a
diversification of the agricultural export base and an
improvement in the terms of trade for these commodities.
The Strategy was particularly explicit about the need
for an,
"increased proportion of lomestic foods in
total food consumption".
This indicated that import substitution and self-
reliance were to be the major themes of the Strategy. Up to
this point in time, as shown in Chapter Two imports had
become the dominant contributor to regional food
consumption, and thus was one of the major reasons for the
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balance of trade difficulties. In lessening the importation
of food the regional economy could receive a boost from the
increased domestic agricultural activity, and the multiplier
effect contingent on increased linkages in this sector.
Not only was most of the region's food imported, but it
tended to be imported in an already processed form, while
the regions exports were usually in raw form. To remove
this imbalance the food processing sector was to be given a
major boost, technologically, managerially and financially.
Weaning foods and food fortification were to be given
special attention.
Although import substitution was a key element of
increased agricultural production the Strategy also
recognized that there would be need for
"maintenance of critical levels of imports in
certain ey foods not readily produced in the
region".
This would be formulated around measures for bulk
purchasing and the development of regional storage systems
for managing extra-regional imports. At the same time the
distribution of food in the Region would be facilitated by
development of the intra-regional food trade system.
It was recognized that improvements in agricultural
output would be successful only if the Strategy could lower
unemployment (especially in the rural areas), generate
higher incomes, improve the infrastructure and increase
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overall economic activity in the agricultural sector. The
new policies would not only increase self-sufficiency but
would also generate an increase in foreign exchange
earnings.
Research and Technology
Although a separate institution in itself the CARDI was
entrusted with the task of research. The Institute was to
identify possible areas for improving the sector. In
conducting its research of systems of production CARDI was
advised to pay special attention to the environment,
economic and social circumstances. The role of the small
farmer was to be of special importance in the Institute's
Research and Development work.
Also to be involved was CARIRI. This institution was
to be involved with the technical aspects of the food
matrix. This involved research in hybrid seeds and trees,
food technology and the technology of animal husbandry and
the use of incubators.
Post-Harvest Activities
The Strategy recognized that a large portion of its
activities would happen outside of the sphere of production.
In the region it was estimated that between 20 to 40 percent
of major food crops were lost after harvest. 8 Thus, a
distinct effort was to be made to development techniques and
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methods for reducing post-harvest losses. This was to
include improvements in harvesting, handling, pre-sale
sorting, the institution of control measures for storage
pests and diseases, and the establishment of appropriate
storage facilities.
In this regard the marketing infrastructure was to be
reshaped. Marketing agencies were to be overhauled and
given financial preference in national budgets. Marketing
information systems to improve data collection and data
dissemination were to be developed. This included prospects
for market research, development and promotion programmes.
Both land and sea transportation systems were to be
rejuvenated at the national and regional level.
Development of Human Capital
Improvements in human capital for effective
implementation of the Strategy were also to be initiated.
It was recognized that without the proper training of
managerial and institutional elements the plan was likely to
be ineffective. Thus, academic and technical training
schemes were to be introduced to aid in the development of
production, processing and distribution of the increased
agricultural output.
A key element of the plan was to be the improvement in
training facilities for skilled manpower. This was to
involve not only technical skills, but also was intended to
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target improved managerial quality. It was recognized that
initially much of the technical and managerial services for
implementation of the Plan was to come from foreign
participants, but it was stressed that as the region's human
capital base developed nationals were to takeover the key
roles. The Caribbean Agricultural and Rural Development
Advisory and Training Service (CARDATS) was entrusted as the
main implementing agency in this aspect of the plan.
Development of the Small Farmer
A major focus of the Strategy was to be the small
farmer. It was recognized that most of the production of
local food commodities was in the hands of small farmers and
that this class was likely to prove the backbone of the new
production thrust. As a result, the research and
development of appropriate technology for small farming was
to be a significant element of the plan. The Caribbean
Industrial Research Institute (CARIRI)and the Caribbean
Agricultural Research Development Institute (CARDI),
regional research bodies, were to give priority to this area
of their research.
Extension services were to be dramatically improved so
that the small farmer could readily participate and take
advantage of the new technological, managerial and financial
provisions that were to be instituted under the Strategy.
The University of the West Indies (UWI) and local Ministries
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of Agriculture were to be the major implementing agencies in
this aspect of the Plan.
The banking sector (both the Agricultural Development
Banks and the commercial banks) was to pay special attention
to this class of farmers in their credit and lending
policies. Land reform measures and the development of a crop
insurance scheme on the national level was also to be
formulated to aid in the development of this class.
Disaster Preparedness Plan
The issue of food security was to be dealt with by a
two pronged attack. First, there was to be the "development
of strategic food reserves against disasters". 6 The stock
was to be used strategically to alleviate suffering in
instances of natural disasters, and was to hold a three
month regional supply food supply. It was to be composed of
cereals, legumes, starchy roots and tubers as well as sugar.
Strategic stock locations were identified in Jamaica and
Guyana. An administrative machinery was to be developed
under either the National Disaster Preparedness Committees
or the National Emergency Organizations in accordance with a
regional body to be specifically established for such
purposes. The ability to have a rapid deployment mechanism
was considered important to the success of the reserve.
Second, it was recognized that,
"food security, as well as the imperatives of
balanced development, demand a significant
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increase in domestic production and a
reversal of food dependency as represrnted by
the current food import/export ratio".
The Strategy appreciated the fact that food security
had both short long term expressions and made provisions for
dealing with both dimensions over time.
Sectoral Policies
Specific sectors were to be target in the implementation of
the Strategy. They were outlined to include fisheries,
dairy production and processing; intensive beef production,
poultry and pork production and processing; processing
livestock feed; edible oil production; fruit and vegetable
production and processing and the production of inputs,
including fertilizers, small tools, containers and seeds.
* * * * * * * *
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY
The Strategy went to great pains to describe the
implementation process to be involved. An elaborate
mechanism for implementation, coordination and supervision
was designed. Since the region covered a large geographic
area and there were different levels of development and
rates of agricultural decay in the member countries
stringent measures were needed if a coordinated
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implementation plan was to be undertaken.
Before delving into the exact nature of the
implementation process of the RFNS an important
qualification must be made. Both the RFP and the RFNS was
meant to be, in the words of the Caribbean Development Bank
(CDB),
"complimentary to national efforts in food
production and were not mear t to substitute
for, nor compete with them".
This point is reiterated several times throughout the
official documents. As such, the organizational structure
reflected the compartmented nature of the plan and to a
great extent its implementation depended on cooperation
among the political leaders of the various countries.
The Caribbean Food Corporation
When the original Regional Food Plan was developed its
main institutional mechanism for implementation was the
Caribbean Food Corporation (CFC). The CFC was established
as a holding company owned by the Member Countries of the
Community. It was mandated that it would participate in
production , processing and marketing enterprises, either
under its own initiative, through subsidiaries, or in
partnership with other agencies including the private
sector.
The CFC was to be involved in all elements of the food
sector, including planning, production, processing, storage,
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transportation, distribution and marketing. In these
endeavors it would be assisted by local marketing boards.
Essentially, the CFC would undertake three prime tasks.
First, it would identify, plan and implement all stages of
the food chain matrix in tandem with regional, national and
local agencies. Second, it would provide the link in
managing the financial, technological and managerial
resources from outside the region necessary for
implementation of the Plan. Third, it would organize the
bulk purchase of production inputs.
After the expansion of the Regional Food Plan into the
Regional Food and Nutrition Strategy the execution of policy
was shifted away from the CFC. The CFC remained an integral
part of the program, retaining its role as a holding company
with a mandate to promote the efficiency and effectiveness
of the regional food producing sector. However, because the
RFNS involved substantially more programs than the RFP the
implementation process was reorganized.
The Inter-Sectoral Committee and other Agencies
The structure designed for the implementation of the
RFNS involved a multi-layered organization with several
committees. Decision-making and advisory functions were
lodged between the Standing Committees/Conference of
Ministers, Committees of Regional Sector Planners/Officials,
the Heads of Regional Agencies (HRA), Board of
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Directors/Policy Committees of Regional Organizations, and
the Ministerial Governing Bodies of the Regional
Organizations.
Two other bodies, the National Food and Nutrition
Councils (NFNCs) and the Inter-Sectoral Committee (ISC) were
entrusted with monitoring and evaluation of the
implementation process.
Execution proper was the function of the National
Ministries, with private sector agencies and regional
agencies executing supporting activities. Figure 3-1 gives
a graphical picture of the structure of the implementation
process. As the figure shows, each of the bodies in the
Strategy's implementation process is intricately linked
together, either directly or indirectly. The process of
implementation was based upon an interactive model among the
agencies. In the process there was a predetermined route
with each body assigned a particular and unique role, that
when combined would enable an effective mechanism for
successfully implementing the RFNS.
First, the Inter-Sectoral Committee and the National
Food and Nutrition Councils would review the sectoral
policies undertaken in the last period and determine new
activities for the next period. In determining the next set
of activities, these bodies would allocate responsibilities
for the national and regional bodies involved. The
implementation plans were to consist of a three year
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FIGURE 3-1. THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
.I... .. GIN~EG OOEOD AN NUTRITION STRATEGY
.-- >REPORTING RELATION.
SHIPS BETWEEN AGENCIES
...... RELATIONSHIP OF THE PRIVAlE
SECTOR, EXECUTING AGENCIES AND
DONOR AGENCIES, VOLUNTARY AND
PROFESSIONAL ORGANISA'IIONS.
Source: Caribbean Comm'rnnity, R oo ad~Ni-rition
Strategy
schedule with programmes prioritized on an annual basis.
Although the process began with a segmented analysis the ISC
was entrusted with the task of incorporating them into a
comprehensive regional plan.
Second, the comprehensive regional plan would then be
submitted to the Heads of Regional Agencies (HRA). This body
would then review the plan and the allocation of activities
for regional agencies. In tandem with the Regional Sector
Planners/Officials, the HRA would them recommend the
implementation plan on a programme basis.
Third, the plan would be again reviewed by the Board of
Directors/Policy Committees of the Regional Agencies. These
bodies would then recommend the approved programmes and
budgets of the regional organizations to the respective
Ministerial Governing Bodies. Finally, the Ministerial
Governing Bodies would weigh the consistency of the
implementation plan with the objectives and priorities of
the general Strategy. Once this stage is approved
regional and national agencies would then be entrusted with
the implementation of the plan. At this point they are
required to have the approved programmes incorporated into
their work program and budgets for the next period and
execution begins.
Once the cycle is complete it begins anew for the next
period. Figure 3-2 shows the planning, evaluation and
implementation process for one period of the Strategy.
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Figure 3.2. SEQUENCE OF ACTIVITIES
STAGE INSTITUTION
1 Inter-Sectoral Committee/
National Food and Nutrition
Councils
2 Inter-Sectoral Committee/
National Food and Nutrition
Councils
3 Heads of regional Agencies
4 Regional Sector Planners
5 Board of Directors/
Policy Committees of
Regional Bodies
6 Standing Committee
/Conference of Ministers
7 Ministerial Governing
Bodies of regional Bodies and
8 National/Regional
Executing Agencies
9 Inter-Sectoral Committee/
National Food and Nutrition
Councils
ACTIVITY
Activity determination and
allocations
Elaboration of implementation plan
Agree to implementation plan
and allocation of activities for
regional agencies
Recommend the Implementation Plans
on a Programme basis
Recommend the work Programmes
and budget of regional organizations
based on the recommendations of
the Regional Sector Planners
Endorsement of the Implementation
Plan on a programme basis
Endorsement of Work Programmes
Budget of Regional Organizations
Implementation of the activities
in the Implementation Plan
Evaluation of the Strategy-
its programmes, activities
and projects at the national
level
Source: Caricom Secretariat, The Regional Food and Nutrition
Strategy, Vol I, 1983.
* * * * * * * *
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SUPPORTING POLICIES
The main body of the CFNS concerns itself with the
physical side of the agricultural situation in the region.
However, the sphere of trade was also dealt with elsewhere
in regional negotiations. These were structured with the
aim of aiding the success of the CFNS and as a result they
should be briefly described in this context.
Through the Common External Tariff (CET) the regional
governments made provision for trade liberalization
involving the removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to
intra-regional trade. This agreement attempted to deal with
the issue of a common protective policy vis-a-vis Third
countries. It has also led to joint negotiations with the
United States, the European Economic Community and the
regional governments have presented a joint negotiating
position at UNCTAD.
Agricultural trade has been specifically dealt with in
the Common Market Annex (CMA) to the Chaguaramas Treaty that
officially brought the Caribbean Community into being in
1973. In Schedule VII of the treaty it specifies the terms
for intra-regional trade in unrefined sugar. The member
states were to also declare their deficits and surplus for
the purpose of each having the opportunity to meet supply
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obligations. In the international market place there was to
be a common regional price.
Schedule IX of the Treaty, termed the Oils and Fats
Agreement, covered the trade in oils and fat. Trading was
to be done on the basis of declared surpluses and deficits
and a negotiated fixed price operating under the auspices of
the Caricom Secretariat.
Raw commodity trade in 22 agricultural products was
dealt with in Schedule VIII of the Treaty. The Agricultural
Marketing Protocol (AMP) was to work with the States
allocating markets based on declared surpluses and deficits
on a six months basis. Upon the declarations, quantities
for trade and fixed prices were then established. Member
states undertook to create agricultural marketing
corporations to coordinate and deal with the expected
increase in regional trade.
* * * * * * * * *
ASSESSMENT OF REGIONAL FOOD AND NUTRITION STRATEGY
The Regional Food and Nutrition Strategy made great
strides in bringing the food crisis of the region into
focus. Its planning and scale of implementation remains one
of the most ambitious regional undertakings to date. Its
most important aspect remains the fact that the Caribbean
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food crisis was recognized to be a regional ailment and
necessitated a regional response if there was to be an end
to its debilitating effects. Unfortunately for the regional
development effort, the Strategy has not led to the
immediate improvements that was visualized by the signers of
the agreement. It would be unfair to be too harsh on the
Strategy for two reasons. First, it has only been fully
implemented since 1983 (the RFP was in operation since 1975,
however). In the scheme of things this may be insufficient
time to give the Strategy to deal with the fundamental
structural deformities it was designed to eliminate.
Second, the region has not been able to come up with
the necessary financial resources to fully finance the
implementation of the scheme. Capital from the
international capital market have proven to be scarce as
metropolitan banks attend to the Third World debt crisis.
The price of petroleum (Trinidad), and bauxite (Jamaica and
Guyana) has remained low and seriously affected the region's
balance of trade dilemmas. At the same time the region's
main source of external aid, the United States, has shifted
its policy in the region from hard cash provisions to
increased market access through the Caribbean Basin
Initiative.
In such a pessimistic atmosphere it is hard to expect
too much out of the regional plan. This does not except it
however, from criticism of its conceptual weaknesses and
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erroneous misunderstanding of the internal mechanisms which
are likely to prove prohibitive to its success rather than
aid its general contribution to the regional integration
process and regional development.
Regional Agricultural Production and Trade
The most useful index of regional increase in general
agricultural production is the production index shown in
Tables 2-5 to 2-8. In this connection it can be seen that
for two of the countries in Table 2-5, Jamaica and Guyana,
agricultural production levels are slightly above 1979-81
levels. However, in per capita terms (Table 2-7) the
picture has been dismal. The decline has continued in
Trinidad, Guyana and Barbados. Only Jamaica has shown a
slight improvement.
With regards to the food production index (Tables 2-6
and 2-8), the picture is hardly more promising. In general
terms Trinidad and Jamaica has shown small improvements,
while Guyana and Barbados continues to slide in their food
output. When assessed over per capita levels, the food
production index shows that all the countries have
deteriorated vis-a-vis 1979-81 except for Jamaica which have
remained more or less constant. Using this index one can
conclude that so far the Regional Food and Nutrition
Strategy has had no effect on the level or structure of
agricultural production in the region. In fact, in 1987 the
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region was in a more perilous situation than it was in 1976
when the Strategy was first conceived.
The regional trade agreements have also failed to
stimulate increases in intra-regional trade. In one report
the World Bank concludes that,
"It is generally true to say that after 15
years of operation the intra-regional trading
agreements have not stimulated intra-regional
trade to the extent envisaged when the
agreements were entered into. In fact in many
instances regional production h 8 experienced
a decline in its market share."'
Trade in agricultural products have remained constant
in value but not in volume. Given price increases this
points to a decline in the volume of trade between the
member countries. However, as shown in Chapter Two
international trade with the region has not declined.
Imports from third countries have continued to increased in
the face of intra-regional declines. The sources of the
declining intra-regional trade are diverse. In many cases
the result has been due to declines in production. This has
definitely been the case with the Oils and Fats Agreement.
Regional output in copra has continued to decline and as
such the importation of corn and vegetable oils is used to
make up the consumption deficiency. Changing patterns in
regional consumption, in favor of wheat and processed food
not produced in the region, also exacerbate the situation.
The very nature of trade agreements have also
contributed to this decline. The agreements sought more to
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protect each country market from the others instead of
forming an open market for intra-regional trade protected
from outside hindrances. In any event,
"The CARICOM experience has shown that highly
institutionalized trade liberalization
mechanisms do not generate significa
increases in trade in the long run."
* * * * * * * * *
CRITIQUE OF THE STRATEGY
The RFNS involved an attempt to coordinate agricultural
production strategies among countries that contain as much
differences as similarities. In addition, any regional
process involves large amounts of compromise on ideological
tangents and the importance of national factors above
regional issues. The RFNS reflects this general approach to
regional cooperation and as such contains rudimentary flaws
that are going to prove fatal in the success of the
Strategy.
As the implementation scheme of the Strategy shows the
plan is a disconnected mass of national policies attempting
to find a common binding (in this case it is food
insecurity). The implementation plan as proposed involves a
decision making process that is disjointed and slow. As
outlined, there is no direct mechanism for the implementing
103
bodies of the plan to interact with the governing body of
the plan until the supervisory bodies have entered into
their supervisory roles. It is very difficult to identify
which body actually holds the final responsibility for the
Plan.
The Plan dictates a three year planning horizon.
However, it does not provide for periodic interim changes.
In the unstable atmosphere of agricultural planning there is
constant need for changes in previous plans. In a period of
change when the final form of the new agricultural system is
not yet clear there will be immense need for regular changes
as issues materialize. As conceived the RFNS allows each
country to hold on to the national reigns of a decaying
system while attempting to build a modern regional
agricultural sector. Both endeavors are incompatible with
each other and so are inconsistent with the achievement of
success.
Given the dismal performance of the national economies
in general, and the agricultural sector in particular, it is
difficult to see why the Strategy attempts to burden the
agricultural sector with such a compact mandate. The
expectations on the sector are too many. There is a lack of
focus in the Plan. The broad plans leave open too many
difficulties in attempting to distribute limited resources
to the manifold problems involved. To expect to have
traditional export production increasing at the same time as
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production for the regional market is to fail to comprehend
the linkages that are inherent in both, to come to terms
with the constraints of the sector, and to appreciate the
limited absorptive capacity in the system. Agricultural
planning must involve a recourse to setting priorities,
understanding streamlining in the sector, and attempting to
influence both for the common good.
In this regard the Plan does not come to terms with
the strangle hold of the traditional crops on the
agricultural sector. In requiring that there be immediate
increases in the output of the traditional sectors the
Strategy sets in motion the age old complications of
agriculture in the region. The strong plantation sector is
likely to use its size to co-opt all the new provisions in
its favor. Without explicitly make provisions for limiting
the influence of this sector it will readily take command of
financial, research and technological resources at the
disposal of the rural economy. Given the resource
limitations presently existing in the regional economy it is
profound to think that the nascent agricultural sectors will
be able to hold their own against the larger plantation
sector. Both sectors will need to have recourse to the same
technological expertise, the same financial institutions arid
the identical managerial resources. This is likely to
overwhelm these institutions with their limited resources
and render them inoperable.
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The Strategy has no mechanism for restructuring or
rationalizing agricultural production on a regional scale.
The expressed aspiration is simply to facilitate national
policies in the same avenue of dualism, so blatantly
responsible for the decline in the first place.
Restructuring of Caribbean agriculture is an absolute must.
As changes in the international economy and regional economy
take place, there will be commensurate need for agriculture
to restructure or face the certainty of stagnation and being
left behind. The dependence of many Caricom countries on
sugarcane, coffee, cocoa, and bananas (and primary
production in general) are outward manifestations of the
failure to restructure in accordance with changing national
priorities, technological processes and the changing
international market place.
Without regional rationalization of agriculture the old
deficiencies, constraints and lack of economies of scale are
likely to remain intact. The very need for a regional
approach to the agricultural question has demonstrated the
failure of national policies to come to terms with the
problem. To a great degree the limitations of agriculture
on a national level are inherent in the economics of size
and the limitations of resources. At a regional level these
constraints are either reduced or comprehensively removed,
since the pooling of regional resources creates
opportunities for enlarged production and the creation of a
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larger and more versatile market.
The provisions for technological research in
agriculture are incongruent with the regional resource base
or its immediate needs. First, there should be more
emphasis on testing existing technologies instead of
searching for innovations. Given the size of the regional
economy at present it has limited capacity to finance basic
research at present. If emphasis is placed on using
existing innovations then the scientific society can remain
just outside the threshold of scientific takeoff until the
economy is able to sustain it on its own. Second,
significant research resources have been geared towards the
traditional sector (the effect of which have already been
dealt with) and to the application of high amounts of energy
in the production process. If this succeeds the likely
result is that a high food import bill will be replaced with
a high energy import bill and the regional dilemma will
reemerge in a different form. The prospects for
environmental degradation will also be increased. With
their small sizes, very few countries in the region will be
able to afford such a decay without it having a negative
impact on their prospects for economic growth.
The emphasis on the needs of the small farmer is going
to prove faulty. As shown in Chapter Two the small farmer
is a dying breed in the region, not only for economic
reasons but also because of changing social attitudes.
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Provisions will need to be made for restructuring the
agriculture sector around a new social class, which is most
likely going to be a young, educated and technologically
oriented group. In the modern era the dignity of
agriculture will come from its attraction to this group, not
from the few remaining aging planters. Emphasis will have
to be made to develop farm sizes that will offer economies
of scale under the new technologies.
The food storage scheme that has been devised to deal
with national disasters is a misguided application of a good
idea. If the only design is to have access to food in the
case of a natural disaster then there is no need for a
storage system. The international community is likely to
respond as fast as any regional scheme, in as large
quantities and with less cost to the region. The real
purpose of a food storage systems should be to stabilize
commodity prices, both of regionally produced goods and of
those imported in large quantities, in the face of
production fluctuations. This is an issue that the Strategy
does not deal with.
In conclusion, it can be seen that the real limitations
of the Regional Food and Nutrition Strategy is that it fails
to include policies for removing the binding constraints on
the region's agricultural sector. It does recognize several
of them. However, it attempts to work within these
constraints rather than focus its resources on removing
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them. This will severely limit the eventual scope of the
Strategy and its ultimate chances for success. More
emphasis needs to be placed on altering the political,
economic, technological, physical and social barriers to a
successful agricultural policy.
The task of the following chapter is to point the major
elements of a new regional planning policy within the
context of RFNS based on an attempt to remove structural
rigidities in the agricultural system. The freeing of the
agricultural sector from its ancient bondage will in the end
determine the eventual pace and standard of regional
development.
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CHAPTER IV
ELEMENTS OF AN APPROACH TO COMPREHENSIVE
REGIONAL PLANNING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
THE CARIBBEAN FOOD AND NUTRITION STRATEGY
110
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental weakness of the Caribbean Food and
Nutrition Strategy (CFNS) is that it approaches regional
agricultural planning from a national perspective. The
Caribbean food crisis has the dimensions of a regional
problem and so dictates a regional response to the crisis.
It is acknowledged that any approach to regional planning
becomes difficult because of the general weakness of all the
economies involved, the fact that they compete with each
other in the agricultural sector and the different political
views existing in the region.
However, the CFNS represents a recognition of the need
for agricultural reform in the region, and more so the need
for a regional approach to the dilemma. Beginning from this
standpoint the following Chapter attempts to lay out a
framework for a comprehensive policy towards the regional
agricultural sector. Instead of initiating the planning
phase from the national level the analysis will begin with
the regional level and work its way downward. The exact
purpose of the framework will be to establish an environment
in which the regional plan can operate at the national level
without hampering the development plans of the latter. The
general thesis is that a regional approach to agricultural
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restructuring is feasible and necessary if national
development plans are to be successful.
A regional approach to agricultural planning brings
with it several advantages. First, one of the major
problems facing the small countries of the region is the
lack of economies of scale. In an environment where there
is some sort of regional rationalization of production is it
more likely that economies of scale can be achieved in the
production process. The constraints on certain agricultural
sectors in one country may not exist in other countries,
thus a properly defined program can restructure in order to
prevent this limitation.
Second, as has been shown, agriculture in the region is
on the decline and there is widespread need for
restructuring and revitalization of the sector. As the CFNS
shows this will involve the need for phasing out some crops,
introducing new ones, interjecting new technologies and
research programs, market research and development and other
procedures if the sector is to rebuilt as a contributor to
the development process. The tasks as outlined are going to
prove well beyond the capabilities of any single country in
the region. In this contest a regional approach will reduce
the burdens involved, spread the risks of the venture, and
increase the likelihood of its success.
Third, as it exists the agricultural sector of the
region is characterized by excessive duplication. This
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takes the form not only of competition among the islands for
the same markets, but also in research and development, in
administrative tasks, and in international negotiations.
The CFNS duly recognizes this, but because it puts the
national approach ahead of the regional difficulties it
fails to really address the problem. A comprehensive
regional plan will allow for a reduction in competition
among the countries of the region, and introduce some degree
of specialization once restructuring is complete. In the
final analysis this is the prime goal of agricultural
rationalization on a regional scale. This can be conceived
as,
"a means of achieving the modernization and
development of agriculture in all Member
States within the integration movement but in
the framework of regional policies which would
encourage the most effective utilization and
specialization of resources, foster
integration of agriculture with other economic
activities, lessen inter-territorial
competition and duplication in resource use,
and achieve greater complementarjty in
regional agricultural production."
Finally, one of the stated long term goals of the
countries of the region is to foster regional integration,
not only economically but also politically. An exercise in
regional planning for agricultural prosperity is going to
contribute towards these ends. Once the task of
agricultural restructuring is complete then the next logical
step is to extend the exercise to other sectors. The
113
problems inherent in the regional agricultural sector also
exist in other sectors and the process of regional
development will demand that they to be addressed in turn.
However, the limited development of the region's resources
dictates that restructuring on all fronts may be too
grandiose an enterprise.
The rest of the Chapter is an attempt to identify an
approach to regional planning that takes advantage of
regional resources and to establish a policy framework that
removes the constraints. It is organized in the following
sequence. First, a general accounting framework will be
developed. The emphasis will be on creating an environment
for regional planning, and also a scheme for monitoring the
progress of the plan. Second, the uses and limitation of
the framework will be analyzed. Finally, a general
exploration of issues involved in the restructuring process
will be undertaken.
* * * * * * * * *
A GENERAL ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK FOR
COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL PLANNING
As it presently exists, the region's agricultural
sector is characterized by each country's agricultural
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sector having only marginal backward and forward linkages.
This extends not only to linkages within the national
economy but also on a regional scale. A process of
restructuring involves the development of policy initiatives
that will increase the linkages of the agricultural sector.
In planning the restructuring process an appropriate
framework must be developed that is capable of capturing
these inter-industry and inter-island linkages and
presenting a framework for their analysis.
Any such locale for regional agricultural planning must
satisfy certain fundamental criteria. First, the chosen
framework must be able to present both the regional and the
national structure of the agricultural sector. The aim here
is to be able to analyze the region as a single entity while
at the same time recognizing that it is made up of
individual parts. The framework thus must have the ability
to both merge and differentiate the different levels of the
agricultural sector.
Second, agricultural restructuring involves the
enhancement of linkages both to and from the sector. The
framework for analysis must be able to capture this effect.
Because the linkages to be developed will demand both
sectoral and geographic differentiation it is important that
the framework be able to accommodate the two.
Third, the framework would be able to show aggregates
for sectoral and regional demand and supply so that policy
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markers can bring both into equilibrium during the process
of restructuring.
Finally, because there is a heavy dependence on
external trade by member countries a great deal of the
restructuring process involves an attempt to reduce the
importation of food supplies while increasing exports.
Thus, the chosen framework must be able to capture this
effect also.
All these criteria are met by using an inter-country
inter-industry input-output matrix. Such a matrix will
treat each country separately with the Rest of the World
treated as a separate country. Figure 4-1 is one possible
format that such a matrix can take on. The figure shows a
two-country 10-sector model, with the Rest of the World as
the third country. In this scheme the Rest of the World
acts as the difference between internal demand and internal
supply. It is not difficult to have the model extended to
include all the parties to the CFNS.
The flows of the matrix will be denominated in
production figures. This use of "hard" figures departs from
the traditional procedures of input-output analysis in this
respect. The use of hard values is defended on several
grounds, all of which are concerned with the possibilities
for economic analysis. The region's agricultural sector has
been severely distorted from decades of economic
mismanagement. All the countries in the region have
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FIGURE 4-1. FLOWS IN TIlE INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL
ANTIGUA
Industry
I 2 3 4 5
GRENADA
Industry
1 2 3 4 s
REST OF WORLD
Industry
1 2 3 4 5
East
I Agriculture .621 .000 .000 .000 .000 .055 .000 .000 .000 .000 .019 .000 .000 .000 .000
2 Mining .000 .586 .000 .000 .000 .000 .063 .000 .000 .000 .000 .021 .000 .000 .000
3 Construction and Manufacturing .000 .000 .738 .000 .000 .000 .000 .156 .000 .000 .000 .000 .105 .000 .000
4 Services .000 .000 .000 .824 .000 .000 .000 .000 .141 .000 .000 .000 .000 .069 .000
5 Transportation and Utilities .000 .000 .000 .000 .721 .000 .000 .000 .000 .165 .000 .000 .000 .000 .126
GRENADAI Agriculture .345 .000 .000 .000 .000 .865 .000 .000 .000 .000 .198 .000 .000 .000 .000
2 Mining .000 .375 .000 .000 .000 .000 .851 .000 .000 .000 .000 .258 .000 .000 .000
3 Construction and Manufacturing .000 .000 .239 .000 .000 .000 .000 .805 .000 .000 .000 .000 .177 .000 .000
4 Services .000 .000 .000 .156 .000 .000 .000 .000 .826 .000 .000 .000 .000 .114 .000
5 Transportation and Utilities .000 .000 .000 .000 .257 .000 .000 .000 .000 .194 .000 .000 .000 .000 .204
REST OF WORLD
I Agriculture .033 .000 .000 .000 .000 .080 .000 .000 .000 .000 .783 .000 .000 .000 .000
2 Mining .000 .039 .000 .000 .000 .000 .086 .000 .000 .000 .000 .720 .000 .000 .000
3 Construction and Manufacturing .000 .000 .023 .000 .000 .000 .000 .039 .000 .000 .000 .000 .718 .000 .000
4 Services .000 .000 .000 .020 .000 .000 .000 .000 .033 .000 .000 .000 .000 .817 .000
5 Transportation and Utilities .000 .000 .000 .000 .022 .000 .000 .000 .000 .041 .000 .000 .000 .000 .670
ANTIGUA
subsidies and special treatment policies for the sector.
These would complicate the picture if nominal values were
used. The same holds for the differing tax structure that
exist in the individual countries. Because the framework
involves different countries with separate currencies,
separate rates of inflation, and different rates of growth a
matrix with nominal values would preclude any systematic
planning decisions to be made, especially when the task at
hand is to bring these disparate factors into line and to
make economic sense of the fractured economies.
In the present contest agricultural prices have a
limited inducement effect because aggregate supply
elasticities are low due to the stagnant nature of the
sector's structure. Therefore,
"an effective use of price policy requires
prior structural change to 'elasticize' th
aggregate agricultural supply response."
As transformation and diversification takes place the
apparent advantages of the preferential crops will begin to
lessen. Therefore, in the short run present production
costs are a poor basis on which to plan the restructuring
process.
If one begins from this perspective, with the "hard"
flows, then once the flows are captured and decisions (which
will have a high political content) are made, then economic
analyses for rationalization can begin. Every project
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defined within the framework could then be subjected to
economic analyses that take account of the respective
countries taxes, subsidies, inflation rates and other
pertinent economic factors. The matrix as proposed is not
intended to be the point of analysis (its structure and
inherent inconsistencies prevent orthodox matrix
manipulations), but rather to present a rational framework
in which planning decisions can be made and monitored.
The suggested matrix contains no provisions for labor
inputs, services or transportation costs. The idea it
embodies is that once the decisions makers decide on which
sectors are to be altered then economic analyses on
feasibility will be undertaken. Injecting these sectors
into the decision making process as is defeats the entire
meaning of restructuring. The process of restructuring will
involve an overhaul of the production system,
rationalization of the macroeconomic environment and the
design of new fiscal policies. Consequently, once the
framework establishes the targeted sectors for production
enhancement, the re-division of production of existing
crops, and the country specific location of the new
industries, then the creation of a new production
environment will become inevitable if the plan is to be
successful. Agricultural restructuring is the goal but the
means dictate a comprehensive overhaul of the existing
economic structure. Thus, despite the limitations of the
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proposed framework there are certain advantages that it
offers to the process of regional restructuring.
First, it gives a comprehensive picture of the extent
of the regional dependence on outside sources. Not only is
direct dependence captured, but also the indirect factors
that are centered in the inputs sectors and the lack of a
viable agro-processing industry. The framework's greatest
attribute is that it merges several disparate agricultural
sectors into one paradigm, which is fulcrum of the CFNS.
Second, it raises the issue of linkages which tends to
be forgotten in many planning processes. In the haste for
economic restructuring and industrialization linkages are
often forgotten until it is to late. Within the proposed
framework, sector priortization can take place, while at the
same time issues of linkages and streamlining are central to
the decision process. Within the context of a regional plan
this will be important both between sectors as well as
across countries.
Third, having "hard" flows as the unit of account
removes the mask of monetary value which emanates from the
different cost functions both across and between industries
and countries. An overly high concentration on monetary
value will also tend to give wrong signals. This occurs
because the markets of the LDCs tend to be anything but
perfect. As shown in Chapter Two the Caribbean economies
are overwhelmed with distortions. Starting from a "hard"
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flows standpoint, attempts can then be make to infuse the
agricultural sector with some sense of economic realism
within the context of Caribbean economy. If monetary values
continue to be the focus of planning decisions during the
restructuring phase planners are likely to be led along the
path dictated by a distorted economy. For example,
plantations crops such as sugar and coffee with their
preferential markets are likely to preserve special
treatment on grounds of present prices.
Fourth, a major part of the restructuring process
involves production diversification. By monitoring the
import sectors planners can have a reasonably well-informed
view of where demand is most concentrated. Thus, even
without price signals consumers can still express their
desired demand to the planners. Of course, part of the
process itself involves bringing demand into line with
regional production. This will mean that taste patterns
that are metropolitan in outlook will have to be realigned
towards tropical foods.
Fifth, as data is collected, and as planning decisions
warrant, the proposed structure allows for a more detailed
outlook by having the sectors disaggregated to lower SITC
numbers. Indeed, because the propose matrix is not
susceptible to orthodox matrix calculations this is no
reason that it needs to conform to any of the traditional
input-output principles. Therefore, sectors can be
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disaggregated in some countries and not in others depending
on their relative importance.
Finally, monitoring capabilities are inherent in the
matrix as it is updated period by period. Thus, success can
be judged by changes in cell values over time. Planners can
even be able to set production, import, or export targets
and monitor to what extent they are realized. Even in the
advent of fiscal policies, the matrix will allow planners to
judge their effect on production and consumption without the
inhibiting masks of subsidies and taxes.
* * * * * * * *
ISSUES IN THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS
Once the input-output interregional matrix has been
completed the task of planning the restructuring process
begins. Given the nature of the plan, decisions will
involve a combination of economic and political processes.
For the immediate present it is more feasible to deal with
the economic factors involved. The general aim of the CFNS
has been to have a food import substitution policy while
expanding the export base of he sector. It has already been
stated that the achievement of both is a rather difficult
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proposal. Which of these policies will receive priority is
going to be more a political than an economic decision. The
regional Heads of Governments, with input from various
technical agencies in the region, will have the deciding
vote. However, it is accurate to predict that the eventual
plan will involve elements of both strategies.
Rationalization will also involve some element of country
specialization, the phase out of some crops and the
introduction of new ones. Special attention will also have
to be paid to linkages and input sectors.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to give the exact
nature of the restructuring process. However, several
important facets that will need to be addressed can be
pointed out.
In designing a restructuring program care should be
taken to not too quickly remove all the old industries. The
design of a general framework allows planners the
opportunity to view linkages in the restructuring process.
Crops that at present seem useless may indeed be very
important in the new program. For instance, sugarcane use
may be diversified out of the production of raw sugar into
the manufacture of feed stuffs and detergents.
The question of diversification must deal with what is
to be diversified out of. One may find that the issues at
hand involves more a restructuring of existing industries
rather than a phasing in of new ones. If the present
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stagnant agricultural institutions remain dominant, then the
introduction of new industries will offer little in the way
out of the present food crisis.
As proposed the matrix allows for the input of all
segments of the agricultural sector. Thus, a major
component of the restructuring process will involve the
possibilities for technological to be fully explored. This
factor will play a significant role in the new regional
agenda. This will be especially so in terms of the actual
form of agricultural that eventually emerges. The new trend
to energy intensive agriculture could prove detrimental in
the long run. An adoption of a new agricultural base than
is energy intensive could prove just as debilitating as the
present structure. If the inputs are beyond the region's
ability to provide, food importing would be replace by
energy importaion. At the same time, political leaders are
bent on expanding the industrial base, the new agricltural
policy will have to take into account tradeoffs in energy
supplies between these two sectors. Means will have to be
found to increase bio-intensive agriculture, or the region
may move from food importing to energy importing. Research
in this field has been underway in a number of contexts and
regional research efforts should be aimed at implementing
and compliment the available body of knowledge.
Restructuring on a regional scale will involve some
amount of country specialization. During the allocation
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process transportation costs will have to be considered.
For crops which are not susceptible to long hauling because
of their costs or because of their perishability, one
possibility will be to actually define "zones of influence".
In this sort of scheme certain countries will be assigned to
produce for a certain radius within the region.
In designing an appropriate framework for regional
agricultural planning one of the most troublesome factors
was the degree of protectionism evident in the region. For
any regional program to work there must be effective
liberalization of trade among the member countries. Once
aspects of specialization are introduced and once production
in some countries become inputs in other countries an
efficient regional production system will demand uninhibited
trade. In a process of restructuring one of the major
challenges is to remove as much of the distortionary factors
as possible so that planners can have clear signals that
lead to efficient use of resources.
For planners the most worrisome technical input will
center around the mobility of labor. For moderately
populated countries such as Trinidad it will be difficult
for them to accept additions to the urban sector, unless
they are certain that the immigrants are going to the rural
sector. Ensuring this will require very imaginative
policies, that do not lead to a police state.
An intra-regional approach to agricultural production
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will necessitate a solidified strategy to extra-regional
agreements. This will extend to such areas as agricultural
development aid and food aid. Some mechanism for pooling
resources from these programs will have to be devised. All
extra-regional agreements on agricultural goods will also
have to be renegotiated and new formulas for country
production shares developed.
Redefining which crops and which countries will be most
affected from the restructuring process will prove a very
thorny issue because of the fact that many countries are
mono-economies and depend heavily on the preferential
treatment. Therefore, some scheme for protection of these
countries will have to be found. One possibility could well
be the process of foreign exchange sterilization on regional
earnings from the sale of crops. Sterilization can take
place not only on the sale of extra-regional goods, but also
on intra-regional goods. The Food and Agricultural
Organizations already developed under the CFNS can be an
integral part of this process. Thereupon, using some
defined formula the earnings can be split among the member
countries. Such a formula can be based on national growth
rates (thus helping out the weakest economies), simply put
in a special fund to be used to further the restructuring
process, or for capital development as administered by the
Caribbean Development BAnk (CDB).
Financing the scheme will prove a very important facet
126
of the regional program. Not only will the weaker economies
need protection, but funds for research and development, for
new agricultural implements, and for infrastructure
development are going to essential ingredients in the
process. There are several sources of finance for the
scheme outside of government revenues and bilateral and
multilateral schemes. First, the crops under preferential
treatment must be made to pay for their own restructuring.
In other words, reinvestment of profits from this sector
must be central to the restructuring process. Second,
imported food stuffs can be used to contribute to the
program. Regional governments will need to keep their
prices higher than would market forces in order to prevent
the undermining of local crops in their nascent period of
development. The process of keeping these prices higher
than input costs will yield considerable sum of finances to
bolster the restructuring program, while at the same time
ensuring protection to local food crops. Third, prices of
local food stuffs will also have to remain artificially high
so that a supply response can be induced. Once
restructuring is under way price policies can be effectively
introduced to signal policy and sectoral preferences.
Reconciliation of the second and third suggestions will
depend on adapting a policy that reflects a higher priority
on local food stuffs, i.e. although their prices must be
kept high they will have to be lower than those of the
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foreign goods.
The elaborate scheme that is being proposed cannot be
implemented without a central coordinating body. This body
will need to have wide-ranging powers and flexibility.
Possible locations are within the Caribbean Development Bank
or the Caribbean Community Secretariat. Its main task will
include monitoring the restructuring process, coordinating
the national policies and consulting with governments in the
region as to the exact role they are required to play.
Because the region is still made up of independent
nation-states the final phase of the program, and its
eventual success will depend on the level of commitment that
is embodied in the letter and spirit of the plan. The role
of the national agricultural ministries will be to assist
the respective agricultural sectors in fulfilling their
assigned tasks. The planning stage will be at the regional
level, but implementation will be a national concern.
National agencies will need to oversee the reorientation of
national sectors, the development of national urban and
rural policies, and other such facets of comprehensive
planning that are crucial to the success of any procedure
for restructuring for development.
* * * * * * * *
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CONCLUSION
A regional agricultural policy is a necessity if the
Caribbean is to pull out of the present food crisis. The
process as proposed here is built on the assumption that
political actors will come to appreciate this fact. Success
for development will depend on the level of political
realism adopted by the respective governments. Regional
planning must be done at a regional level. The exact
process will involve some sort of negotiated setting of
priorities. Once these are complete, the next phase will be
to allocate geographic and agency specific responsibilities.
Finally, faith must be have in the ability and commitment of
the national bodies to act in the common good.
Agricultural planning cannot be the end all of regional
cooperation. Instead as the success of agriculture becomes
evident it will pave the way for cooperation in other
spheres. An agricultural policy cannot be separate from an
industrial policy, and in the same way an exporting policy
cannot be unrelated to an importing policy.
The issues facing the region in the drive for economic
development are many and diverse. The real challenge
involves designing innovate policies to overcome the
hurdles. An attempt has been made here to develop an
appropriate framework for planning regional food security.
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The Caribbean Food and Nutrition Strategy has been a step in
the right direction, working under its auspicies has much to
offer the respective national governments. It is hoped that
the work embodied in this paper will further its original
aims. For all intent and purposes it will advance the
planning perspective of the region. The real contribution
of the paper has been to show that planners must not
concentrate on the limitations of the existing framework but
strive to remove the constraints that at present shackle
development prospects within the region. The era is ripe
for a new perspective on regional economic prosperity. All
the necessary ingredients for comprehensive regional
planning exists. The real task before decision makers in
the region is to develop the will to consolidate thes
disjointed schemes into a realistic adn viable framework for
regional development well into the next century.
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Chapter II
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